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Introduction
This thesis describes in detail the development of a vast bureaucracy of 
surveillance by provincial authorities around alcohol control, and concerns itself with 
the categories employed in a vast social sorting operation of drinkers undertaken from 
1927 into the 1970s when the system was finally discontinued. In short, at issue are the 
contact points where categories are flush with material technologies. This is a history 
lesson in surveillance, the theoretical relevance of which for today lies precisely in the 
extraordinary transformations it made possible in terms of social identity construction 
and control. The social sorts accomplished by the Liquor Control Board of Ontario 
(LCBO), working in conjunction with three levels of government agencies and police 
forces, could transform the most private interests into public matters, in the process 
recategorizing individuals and redefining their material possessions and property. 
Beyond technology is, then, the power that accrues to those and their cohorts who use 
the categorization of such personal information for varied and politically motivated 
purposes of social control. In short, the concern expressed here is with an all-too- 
contemporary history -  “list” making -  and its social consequences. To use the ominous 
words of Edwin Black (2001 ; 92) in his study of the informational equivalent of 
blitzkrieg, that is, the speed-processing of data by Hollerith machines, when “lists were 
everywhere” the politics of race became diabolical.
In his work IBM and the Holocaust Black correctly points out that “[mjankind 
barely noticed when the concept of massively organized information quietly emerged to
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Ill
become a means of social control, a weapon of war, and a roadmap for destruction” 
(Ibid:7), To this day only modest contributions have been made to the theorization of 
the social impact of sorting and tabulating technologies on targeted populations, while 
too little attention has been paid to the vital social moment when these technologies 
were adopted and put to work by businesses and governments around the world. In this 
way the field of surveillance research is somewhat troubled, as in-depth, original 
historical research has been overlooked. The ever increasing development o f ‘new’ 
technologies has, thus far, effectively displaced historical analysis and further 
fi’agmented knowledge. It is the general purpose of this research to allow for historical 
analysis to play a more active role in the development and validation of theory within 
the field, while also contributing to knowledge by reviewing and explaining the 
historical development of these technologies. More specifically, this research was 
conducted in order to investigate the development and impact of sorting and tabulating 
technologies along with their subsequent categories on Canadian populations with a 
specific focus on the First Nations and others defined as “Indians” either through law or 
cultural categorization.
The birth of the LCBO occurred in a very particular social moment in Ontario 
history. Its conception, development, need to instill social control, and thus need for 
surveillance technologies came as the complex result of the mixture of political 
conservatism, temperance and business that constituted the hegemonic politics of the 
time It is important to understand that temperance played a crucial role in the moral 
socialscape of 1920's Ontario. The province had just entered prohibition as a result of 
the war effort and although not all people felt that liquor should remain illegal, liquor
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was presented as a social ill, and the liquor trade as the exploitation of the poor and 
weak willed people of the province. The province had also elected a conservative 
government on the promise of balancing the budget - and for whom liquor taxation was 
considered a necessary means to that end. What resulted was an LCBO created by a 
business focused conservative party, that relied upon the knowledge and abilities of the 
business elite for the so-called proper running of the liquor trade, not to mention the 
ability to launch an extensive promotional campaign to create and maintain support for 
this means of balancing the provincial budget. As it will become apparent these initial 
themes of temperance morality and the Board's social duty were forged into the 
bureaucratic policies and processes of the LCBO shaping its interactions and 
relationships with both individual actors and social groups. The first chapter of this 
thesis seeks to flesh out these pertinent elements of the 1920's Ontario social landscape 
in order to better understand the roots, origins and purposes of the tools and methods of 
surveillance and social control explained in the later chapters of this thesis.
The second and third chapters of this thesis focus on the actual technologies 
employed by the LCBO in order to fulfill the social role given to it by the government. 
Because of the strength of the temperance vote the key word that the government wanted 
to be associated with the Board was ‘control’. In numerous speeches given by the 
government of the province the Board's role was defined plainly as to "know exactly 
who is drinking and how much and what disposition is being made of it"
(Ferguson. 1926). One can see clearly here the centrality of surveillance within the 
Board's role. Initially the Board relied upon a liquor permit book - a passport-like 
document that had to be purchased annually - and kept detailed records on both the
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permit holder and the purchases s/he made, as the means by which it gazed into the lives 
of permit holders. The Board, by making permittees aware of the penetration and 
permanence of this gaze, used it as a means of regulating behavior.
Chapter two investigates the permit books and their impact on individuals by 
drawing on Foucault's (1977) hterature on the Panopticon. These books were designed 
to allow not only a means of creating a constant and all-seeing gaze into the permit 
holder’s liquor use, but also to instill in the holder of the permit a need for self-discipline 
and control of “unwanted” behaviors. In this way LCBO policy, technologies and 
expectations of the result of employing this cluster of strategies mirrored exactly the 
type of social dynamics explained by Foucault; specifically that subjected individuals 
would fall into a pattern of self-disciphne and conformity. The permit books and 
subsequent technologies were in addition directed towards LCBO employees. The books 
themselves were stamped by employees that used unique traceable stamps and purchases 
required paperwork that effectively made visible all of the internal workings of local 
LCBO outlets to head office in Toronto. What was of interest was the extent to which 
LCBO board members at head office had faith in the regulatory power of this type of 
surveillance as well as its effectiveness in the detection and prosecution of deviant 
vendors. It was in this oppressive climate that vendors developed a resistant 
occupational tactics of evasion.
Chapter three turns its focus towards the technologies that were employed behind 
the scenes, those that remained hidden firom the public and even remained little known 
outside of the board members of Head Office. It was central to the LCBO's mandate to 
ensure that no individuals deemed “unfit” to drink were ever served in its stores. What
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VI
this meant for the province was a massive social sorting program designed at identifying 
who could and could not employ self-control -  that is, demonstrate sufficient self- 
control through the panoptic social forces of the liquor permit book. Initially this meant 
that the LCBO simply needed to cancel individual permits and ensure that no fiirther 
purchases could be made by, for example, acquiring another permit. Persons with 
cancelled permits had their names and likenesses placed on the “cancelled list”.
With the opening of Standard hotels and other establishments licensed to sell 
liquor in 1934 the Board soon realized that liquor permit books afforded an incomplete 
means of control, as canceling a permit no longer necessarily meant that the individual 
could no longer purchase liquor legally. So the Board's regulatory mechanisms pushed 
outwards, forming bonds with police, Indian Affairs, city relief offices and non­
governmental organizations in order to ensure that those deemed unworthy of "the 
permit privilege" would be unable to purchase liquor within the province. The new list, 
based on the interdiction laws of the latelSOO’s, would be much more invasive, require 
much in terms of more surveillance resources, as now individuals could no longer “opt 
out” of LCBO classification, surveillance and regulation by simply not buying a liquor 
permit. What was of critical interest for this thesis was the employment of this 
“interdiction list” and what this list meant for the individuals and groups that were 
subject to this classification system.
A thorough review of surviving physical documents as well as the LCBO’s 
internal communications revealed a complex system of classification designed to reduce 
LCBO contact with individuals who posed an unacceptable level of risk as far as alcohol 
was concerned. What was obvious firom the LCBO’s internal documents and
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communications was it had specific targets in its sights, and that targeted individuals as 
well as groups were dealt with diligently - or else - vendors themselves would be put 
under investigation, fired or even prosecuted under provincial law. The interdiction 
program was aimed at those who could not afford to buy liquor without impoverishing 
their families, those who drank to excess, those who were defined as “Indians” under 
federal law, and those who were receiving aid or social assistance fi'om their 
municipalities. Though specific types of individuals were specifically mentioned within 
provincial law the Board also sought to use the powers of the interdiction list to control 
unwanted behaviors such as vagrancy, sexual promiscuity in women, the social drinking 
behaviors of the working class and the actions of certain racially defined groups. The 
most noteworthy of these latter were the First Nations peoples, as LCBO Head Office 
warnings about serving “Indian looking” individuals were constantly sent to vendors; 
indeed, this topic was granted its own section within the LCBO vendor handbook.
The findings of chapter three also support the work of Gandy (1993) and his 
concept of the panoptic sort, as well as other social sorting literature, in that the 
limitation of risk is a key initiator of social sorts and administrative surveillance models.
Chapter four reviews the remaining LCBO Interdiction files in order to 
investigate whether the LCBO policy of interdiction, reviewed in chapter three, was 
consistent with the implementation of the interdiction program on the ground. To do this 
a linear regression was performed in order to determine the statistical predictors of being 
added to the interdiction hst. The interdiction files remain at the Archives of Ontario and 
include a vast array of personal information regarding both the individual feeing 
interdiction and the circumstances surrounding the investigation and interdiction ruling.
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These files are incredibly detailed and include personal information as to where the 
individual lived, who had made the request, why the individual was investigated, the 
results of a formal investigation into the individual’s drinking, police records and finally 
whether or not the individual was interdicted. This detailed information allowed for a 
multifaceted investigation, reviewing the individual details for predictors of interdiction.
As was predicted fi’om reviewing the LCBO's internal documents and policies, 
race, class and gender all were significant predictors of interdiction, though the 
regression also pointed to institutional relations with the police, city relief officers and 
Indian Affairs, as well as revealing which reasons for interdiction were pursued with the 
most diligence. This analysis also added detail to the LCBO’s interdiction investigation 
programs and the social relations that resulted in individuals seeking to have others 
interdicted. The research showed that applications were made overwhelmingly by 
women, who were in most cases seeking to have their husbands interdicted. A fiirther 
finding was that women’s applications were less hkely to result in interdiction, that the 
most successful applications came fi’om governmental institutions such as the police, 
and that the region in which the individual under investigation lived also impacted 
interdiction. Further, fi’om this material one can also see the internalized morality of the 
temperance movement through Board action in regards to who was ultimately selected 
for interdiction. As policies, regulations, and internal documents show and, as the 
regression also shows, the interdiction list was used to enforce the morality of the 
temperance movement. From running simple fi-equencies one can see that it was the 
poor, women, “Indians” and those defined by the Board as having a “weaker” moral 
character that were the targets of interdiction. While chapter four lays out and explains
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some of the relationships between the LCBO and targeted individuals, chapters five and 
six deal, in much greater detail, with the social relations surrounding the targeted First 
Nations peoples as well as fijrther investigating the particular relationship that existed 
between women and the LCBO.
Although it was known prior to this research that today LCBO outlets in remote 
parts of the province are flash points for racism and prejudice, what was unknown was 
the extensive role that interdiction classification played in the development of the 
current stereotypes surrounding alcohol and the First Nations peoples. The details of this 
relationship, culled from LCBO policy, circulars and internal documents, were very rich 
and showed the overtly racist stance that the LCBO took towards First Nations’ 
drinking. Board policy was primarily designed to insulate itself from prosecution for 
serving “Indians” as was stipulated in both the federal Indian Act and Ontario’s Liquor 
Control Act^ however. Board policy relied on local knowledge and prototypical 
classification as its means of determining who was in fact an “Indian”. The Board also 
informed vendors that all “Indians” were a priori on the interdiction list. In addition to 
this the Board did not rely on legal definitions of race and, instead, accepted the 
enfranchisement card as sole proof of non-Indian status. This formalized and quasi-legal 
relationship impacted the identity and the classification of “Indians” for all First Nations 
peoples, as it limited who was classified as an “Indian”, created concepts about 
“Indians” such that they were prone to abuse alcohol and spending their money foolishly 
on liquor. Also since only those who held enfranchisement cards, and not their children 
(since they were ineligible to obtain their own cards) were allowed access to liquor, only 
a very particular person of First Nations lineage was “rewarded” with “white” rights.
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Effectively, an enfranchisement card meant that one had given up one's First Nations 
lineage and entered white society.
Chapter five also pursues the impact of prototypical classification, a type of 
classification that relies on the conceptual closeness of individuals to known social 
categories, that is, on what is called category tightness. First Nations peoples were 
conceptualized as a priori interdicted and this was the means of controlling their access 
to hquor; but, defining who was an “Indian” was a matter of extreme difficulty for the 
LCBO. LCBO policy ultimately took the easiest route, denying all “Indian”-looking 
individuals access to alcohol and only if an applicant pressed the issue would the vendor 
look into the lineage of the individual in question. This policy forced vendors to rely on 
prototypical classification, that is deciding if an individual was conceptually linked to 
the “Indian” stereotype to determine the race of the applicant.
The LCBO's reliance upon prototypical classification allowed the category to be 
affixed with equal ease to individuals of non-First Nations lineage, and forced 
individuals labeled as "Indians" into socially deviant acts such as drinking in public 
places, consuming alcohol and alternative substances in dangerous ways (criminalizing 
these behaviours). Ultimately the LCBO unified the previously independent categories 
of interdicted person and “Indian” as they were both “known” to have the same 
stereotypical traits. Soon after use of the interdiction list became widespread, circa 1934, 
it became known as the “Indian hst” and deviant drinking patterns became incorporated 
into the “Indian” prototype. This chapter reviews the complex relationship between the 
First Nations and LCBO pohcies of classification through the theoretical work of 
Bowker and Star (2000:62) on “convergence” and “tightness” while also incorporating
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the concept of prototypical classification firom Lakoff (1987) and Taylor (1995) in 
explicating how the interdiction classification affixed itself with such tightness to the 
peoples of the First Nations.
Chapter six describes the relationship between women and the interdiction hst. 
This chapter details the significant role that gender played in predictions of interdiction, 
and explains the relationship that women had with the LCBO's hst-making activities. 
Women almost exclusively constituted aU apphcations made by individuals to have 
someone investigated for interdiction, and though the interdiction of women themselves 
was a rare event, it held significantly more severe consequences for the women 
involved. This chapter returns again to the data provided by the investigation into the 
interdiction files of the LCBO.
From the outset of this research it was obvious that many women sought to 
control the drinking habits of their husbands by invoking the regulatory powers of the 
LCBO. The reason most often provided by women was abuse or overindulgence, and in 
these files are found detailed explanations of violence against women. But the files also 
show that women sought Board power out of spite, as a means of controUing non-hquor 
related acts, and even as a means to reward desired behaviours. When the regulatory 
powers of interdiction were directed at women a very different set of social relations 
emerged. Unlike the peoples of the First Nations, “white” women were allowed legally 
to drink, however, the LCBO’s concept of proper womanhood, gained though the 
temperance movement of the 1900’s, could not properly conceptualize the kind of 
female drinkers who appeared with the end of prohibition. The LCBO understood that 
liquor was a means of destroying a woman’s virtue, and set themselves against this norm
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by strictly controlling the behaviour of women who came to their attention. Listed 
individuals were subjected to heightened surveillance and forced into social 
relationships and actions that labeled them as “drunks” and in need of control.
Requests to investigate women for interdiction most often came fi'om the police. 
Secondly, spouses sought interdiction for their wives as a means to bring them under 
some sort of control. The files hold records of paper correspondence between women 
targeted for interdiction and the LCBO. From these letters may be observed a decisive 
change in an individual's relationship to the interdiction label. Almost all subjected 
individuals began with a very defiant position against their new classification and what 
it entailed, those who were repeatedly interdicted soon adopted the label as part of their 
identity as well as the need to be externally controlled by the LCBO.
From the research presented in this thesis several themes emerge, though the 
most dominant elements are related to categorization and its ability to impact both 
individual and social identity. External to the individual we can see that LCBO 
categorization lead to convergence, or the adoption of categorical traits, by both 
individuals and groups through the alteration of social relations caused by the 
classification itself. In this case the LCBO classification dictated social action, both in 
the form of the labeling process of interdiction as well as in the criminalization of acts 
that were legal for others. First Nations were forced into dangerous drinking behaviours; 
the observance of these reinforced the label of problem drinker and the fiirther tightened 
the classification. This bureaucratic inscription of identity is presented in detail in the 
pages of this thesis. While each chapter investigates these themes through fairly 
independent means, their constitutive force as far as categorical convergence is
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concerned remains.
The bulk of the data presented in this work was drawn from archival material in 
the form of the LCBO’s internal circulars. The LCBO circulars were the means by 
which head office contacted local stores and they contained detailed instructions as to 
how LCBO policy should be carried out on the ground. The LCBO required that all 
vendors, and in some cases all employees, sign and return a form showing they had read 
and understood the contents of each and every circular. The historical period of research, 
for the most part, precedes the proliferation of the telephone so circulars contained all 
instructions from head office and were invaluable in understanding Board policy, vendor 
responsibilities and concepts behind LCBO action. The circulars were numbered 
numerically and are cited within this text with the circular number as well as the date of 
issue. LCBO circulars 1-5000 can be found at the Archives of Ontario in the RG-41-3 
series.
Data that appears in the subsequent chapters regarding the Interdiction List, the 
information regarding listed individuals as well personal correspondence with the 
LCBO, were collected under a research agreement #2004-071 with the Archives of 
Ontario under the Freedom of Information Act. As per the agreement no material was 
presented in this text that would allow for the identification of any particular individual 
who was interdicted or whose private information was within the interdiction files. The 
interdiction records can be found at the Archives of Ontario in the RG-36-13 series.
What this thesis, in its entirety, seeks to portray are the tools, methods and 
procedures of surveillance implemented by the LCBO from 1927-1976 to control access 
to alcohol by the people of Ontario and the consequences of this for targeted
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populations, in hopes of developing a better historical and theoretical understanding of 
surveillance technologies and their implementation.
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Chapter 1
Temperance Morality, Business and Surveillance at the Birth of the LCBO
We are handing the problem over to a business administration o f capable men, who will 
have within their authority the entire administration o f this problem, and their judgment 
will not be subject to review either by a court o f this land or the government o f this 
province.
- Provincial Premier Howard Ferguson, on the formation o f the Liquor Control Board 
o f Ontario in 1927
The province of Ontario and the Dominion of Canada where both very interested 
in the prospect of government controlled hquor sale. The issue appeared in Ontario on 
the voting card as early as 1893, and even though the repeal of prohibition faced 
repeated defeats, in pubhc référendums and plebiscites, both the federal and provincial 
governments continued to poll their citizens almost continuously into the early 1900s. 
Federal votes were conducted in the province of Ontario in 1898 and 1920, while votes 
held by the provincial government occurred in 1893, 1902, 1919 and 1924. In Ontario 
the results of each vote were the same - support for prohibition and the continuance of 
the popular Canada and Ontario Temperance Acts restricting the sale of liquor in the 
province.
However, the Ontario Plebiscite of 1924 was interpreted differently by the 
Ontario government. The government argued that a marked change had occurred in the 
sentiment toward temperance in the province. Premier Howard Ferguson stated that “the 
repeated votes upon the issue of temperance indicate a marked falling off in the 
sentiment of support of the Ontario Temperance Act” which then, he added, justified the 
government’s already drafted plans of creating a commission for the controlled sale of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
liquor in Ontario (Ferguson. 1926:6). But the 1924 vote and resulting formation of the 
LCBO were not without controversy. Tremendous increases in registered voters for the 
1924 referendum, as well as questionable actions within Queen's Park surrounding the 
Liquor Control Act legislation, seriously called into question the “significant shift” in 
public morality that was the government’s justification for the implementation of liquor 
sales. These matters are of importance to this text because by shedding light on the 
troubled birth of the LCBO one can obtain a much deeper understanding of the forces 
behind Board policy and the social forces that gave rise to their implementation of an 
elaborate administrative surveillance system to monitor and control the consumption of 
alcohol in Ontario, based on of point-of-purchase technologies as well as vast social 
sorting techniques.
The 1924 Plebiscite
Ontario was called to vote on the issue of prohibition again by Ontario’s 
Conservative Ferguson Government in 1924, only four years after the unsuccessful 
federal vote of 1920 and very soon after the general election of 1923. The plebiscite 
consisted of two questions. The first was “Are you in favour of the continuance of the 
Ontario Temperance Act?” and the second “Are you in favour of the sale as a beverage 
of beer and spirituous hquor in sealed packages under Government control?”(Legislative 
Assembly of Ontario. 1925). The Ferguson government was strongly for the sale of 
hquor, as they saw in it a key way of achieving one of their election promises of 
balancing the budget. The government seems to have phrased the questions on the basis
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of those questions that did well in the 1919 referendum. The official results of the 
referendum gave those who were in favour of the continuance of the Ontario 
Temperance Act a slim victory of 33,915, or about two per cent of the total vote (See 
figure 1-1 below).
Figure 1-1. The Official Results of the Plebiscite of 1924
Date Ballot Question Yes No Majority
1924 1. Are you in favour of the continuance of the Ontario 
Temperance Act?
2. Are you in favour of the sale as a beverage of beer and 





♦Source - Legislative Assembly of Ontario. (1925) Returns from the Plebiscite Holden Under the Ontario 
Temperance Act, 1924. King’s Printer. Toronto.
The plebiscite, however, was widely criticized over the number of names that 
appeared on the voter’s list and some went so far as to suggest that the ballot had 
included the votes of “absents and dead men against” prohibition (Constituent. 1924). In 
one instance 37,000 had registered to vote in the town of Kitchener, which had a 
population of only 38,691 people (The Globe. Avalanche o f Names in Plebiscite Vote 
Amazed Windsor. Oct.6^^1924).
Due to the proximity of the 1923 general election a fairly accurate analysis of the 
voter’s list can be made. Although the overall numbers suggest only a slight increase of 
221,579 voters representing 11.71% of the total vote, individual districts saw 
tremendous changes in their voter’s lists (Legislative Assembly of Ontario. 1925). Thirty 
separate districts that had previously supported prohibition in the 1919 referendum saw a 
decline in their number of registered voters when compared to the 1923 general election. 
This decline, over a one year period, resulted in a total decline of prohibition, or “dry”.
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supporting districts of 15,682 or 8.3% of the total vote. Of the remaining districts many 
saw increases in the thousands. The most notable being Toronto North East which saw 
an increase o f26,152 or 33%, and Russell 7,601 or 39.42%, both of which had voted 
against prohibition in the 1919 referendum and again in the 1924 referendum. Of the top 
ten districts that saw the largest decrease in registered voters between 1923 provincial 
election and the 1924 plebiscite 9 voted “dry” or for prohibition, while the top ten 
districts that saw the greatest increases all voted “wet” or for government sale of liquor 
(see table below).
Figure 1-2 . Largest Changes in Registered Voters Between 1923 and 1924 and 
How they Voted








1 Niagara Falls Wet -1,296 (-7%) 1 Toronto N.E. Wet 26,152 (33%)
2 Brant N. Dry -927 (-8%) 2 Toronto N.W. Wet 15,163 (19%)
3 Hastings N. Dry -911 (-9%) 3 York E. Wet 14,787 (22%)
4 Grey S. Dry -804 (-6%) 4 York W. Wet 14,270 (19%)
5 Essex S. Dry -691 (-5%) 5 Windsor Wet 10,668 (26%)
6 Oxford S. Dry -630 (-5%) 6 Toronto S.W. Wet 9,984 (19%)
7 Lambton E. Dry -601 (-6%) 7 Russell Wet 7,601 (39%)
8 Simcoe W. Dry -594 (-5%) 8 Ottawa W. Wet 6,325 (12%)
9 Leeds Dry -588 (-6%) 9 Parkdale Wet 5,986 (19%)
10 Prince Edward Dry -558 (-5%) 10 Hamilton E. Wet 5,392 (10%)
NB - Tabulated from the official results as published in the Ontario Gazette. (1923) Statement o f Votes 
polled 1923. King’s Printer Toronto, and Legislative Assembly of Ontario. (1925) Returns from the 
Plebiscite Holden Under the Ontario Temperance Act, 1924. IGng’s Printer. Toronto.
In the 1924 plebiscite over 1,891,000 individuals were registered to vote, 
representing 100.2% of the adult population in Ontario as reported by the census 
(Statistics Canada as reported in Pophem and Schmit.1958). The Government, as well as
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those supporting liquor sales, argued that the marked increases in voters could be 
attributed to tax dodgers who had previously avoided being placed on the voter’s lists 
who now, in light of being able to vote on the possibility of legalizing alcohol sales, 
were willing to register, pay taxes and vote (The Globe. Avalanche o f Names in
Plebiscite Vote Amazed Windsor. Oct.6^^1924). This is however unlikely due to the fact
that votes on the legalization of liquor had occurred in Ontario in 1902, 1919 and 1920
before the plebiscite of 1924 (see Figure 1-3 below).
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NB- Although the 1919 vote displayed spectacular support for prohibition in Ontario it too was plagued 
by criticism for voter registration. One can gain confidence as to the approximate level of 60% for 
prohibition and 40% for govermnent sale from the 1902 and 1920 votes due to the consistency of 
registered voters, ballots cast and the continuity of the “wet” vote when compared with 1919 and the “dry” 
vote when compared with 1924.
Government Control, Anyway (Regardless)
When the legislation for liquor control was originally put forward in 1926 liquor
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sale was considered by Ontario’s highly temperate population as an economic 
exploitation of the poor and weak moraled people of the province. Political cartoons and 
temperance warning posters often showed liquor being exchanged for death or blood and 
liquor vendors as vultures preying on the working class.
Figure 1-4. Temperance Cartoon “Watching for Prey” 1915
WATCHING FOR PREY
*NB: As published in Review and Herald Publishing Association. (1915) The Shadow o f the Bottle. New 
York: South Bend Ind. 124.
After losing the vote on government control of alcohol sales in the plebiscite of 
1924, the Ferguson government continued to press the issue. They argued that since a 
significant change in opinion had been shown since the 1919 referendum, public opinion 
in the province was moving inevitably towards the endorsement of government control 
of liquor sales and distribution (Ibid:6). In 1926, before the general election, the 
Ferguson government had already fully planned the format which government control 
would take and was already hinting at the specific nature of how liquor sales would be
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conducted in Ontario (Ibid: 18).
In creating the LCBO the Ferguson government argued that it would be “handing 
the problem over to a business administration of capable men,” giving these men 
authority over “the entire administration of the problem” and not having them “subject 
to review either by a court of th[e] land or the government of th[e] province” (Ibid:4). 
The complete Liquor Control Act was ofl5cially read before the house on March
9th 1927 to much public criticism. Other than the simple fact that the LCA allowed for 
the sale of liquor, arguments against the bill focussed on the unchecked powers awarded 
to the Board (The Globe. Wide Powers Given Control Board by New Liquor Bill. March 
IQlh 1927). Section 25 (2) stipulated that
every action, order or decision of the Board as to any matter or thing in 
respect of which any power, authority or discretion is conferred on the 
Board under this Act shall be final and shall not be questioned, reviewed 
or restrained by injunction, prohibition or mandamus or other process or 
proceeding in any court or be removed by centiorari or otherwise in 
court” (Liquor Control Act S.0.1927. c.70 s.25.2).
Many feared that these unchecked powers would lead to serious and widespread abuses, 
especially since the LCBO was to act under the direct authority of the provincial 
government.
The government, however, openly discussed the reasons for the Board’s absolute 
powers, citing the need for strong policing powers and extensive business knowledge as 
safeguards against the abuse of liquor and political corruption (Ferguson. 1926). Pressure 
against the bill came fi'om organizations ranging from the Christian Women’s
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Temperance Union to the National Brewer’s Association. Ferguson responded by 
promising that the bill would be discussed at length in parliament and that the 
government was open to “sensible arguments” from all sides (The Globe. Nuns Continue
to Fight Against Liquor Store. March 192?; Ferguson. 1927:4).
Upon the second reading, however, the openness and willingness of the 
government drastically changed. During the ensuing debates W.E. Raney, leader of the 
Progressive Party, argued that a Board with such immense powers should not exist under 
the government, and the Liquor Control Board should act autonomously like the newly 
formed board that regulated Ontario’s electricity (Globe. Liquor Control Bill Passed by
Committee with Few Revisions. March 25*^ 1927). Raney argued (correctly) that this 
proposed Board could be used as a political tool if it remained under the control of the 
government, but even under this tremendous political pressure the Ferguson government 
would not budge and the bill narrowly passed its second reading. Facing dissent even 
from within his own party Ferguson ordered the third and final reading to occur without
warning at 10pm on March 30^^ 1927, and due to the sudden nature of the vote only a 
“handfiil of members ” were present (The Globe. Liquor Bill Gets Reading Without
Opposition. March 3Qfh 1927).
Temperance Morality and the Liquor Control Board o f Ontario
Needless to say, in 1926 the Liquor Control Act (LCA) was not popular 
legislation and even after the bill was made law the Ferguson government remained in 
an almost constant battle of propaganda with temperance groups on issues of the ills of
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liquor and the effectiveness of the provincial system of control. Public sentiment 
surrounding liquor sales was portrayed in the press such that “if the Government 
expected to be returned at the next and succeeding elections” they could not permit it to 
be shown that revenue had come “from the ruination of families or creating drunkards” 
(Willison. 1924). To this end the government sale system was forced to be firmly centred 
around the concept of strict liquor control and temperate morality.
From its onset the LCBO sold itself as the answer to the problems of bootlegging 
and excessive consumption; it even went so far as to portray itself as an anti-drinking 
organization. The Board expressed strongly to its workers that they had the “success of 
the law in their hands” and that they were to be active in “preventing discredit falling 
upon the store system through immoderation or other wrongdoing by permit holders”
(LCBO Circular 497, 3 82.19281; LCBO Instructions to Vendors Regarding the Issuing 
Permits. 1928:5). The biggest fear was that “such cases may be featured in the press and 
be seized as opportunity for criticism of the Liquor Control Act, vendors and issuers” 
(LCBO Circularl292.1931).
Even the strategic placing of LCBO outlets around the province was highly 
scrutinized and based on temperance values. Not only were stores far from churches and 
schools but they were also “confined to points where they may be found necessary to 
check petty bootlegging and better social conditions” (LCBO Annual Report 1928-1929.
 ̂ LCBO Circulars as well as the various Vendor handbooks were received through either a Freedom of 
Information Act request to the LCBO or from the Archives of Ontario RG-41-3 Administrative Records of 
the General Manager o f the Liquor Control Board o f Ontario 1927-1986 or the RG-36 series.
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1929; 14). The Board was resolute in its temperate and moral mission, and explained to 
their workers that:
Vendors and Permit Clerks must realize that the object of the act is 
twofold. On the one hand, to stop the activities of the bootlegger and 
transfer as much as possible his enormous gains to the people of the 
province. On the other hand, a matter of as great, if not indeed greater, 
importance, to regulate and, as much as possible control the use of liquor, 
to prevent sales where they ought to be prevented and thereby improve 
social conditions to the ftillest extent possible. OflBcers will please realize 
that profits in their stores are subsidiary to public service and that proper 
public service demands the most careful security and control of 
purchases. The worst offence a Permit Clerk can be guilty of is allowing 
indiscriminate sales which can only give rise to abuses” (LCBO 
382.1928).
The LCBO continuously affirmed to its employees that "the key word is not ‘sale’ but 
‘control’” and that it was
essential to remember that sales and profits are secondary considerations, 
that the primary one is control; that volume of sales and profits may 
actually in some stores indicate laxity toward abuses of the permit 
privilege, and that satisfactory service in a store is best proved by 
prevalence of good social conditions in the surrounding community, 
absence of drunkenness and disorderliness, and freedom of complaints of 
neglected wives and families (LCBO Circular 497.1928).
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The LCBO also knew that it was highly vulnerable to criticism and sought to limit 
dissenting voices by tightly controlling the public release of information. Employees at 
the LCBO were repeatedly reminded by Head Office “that no information must be given 
out to the public, concerning the affairs of the Board”(LCBO Circular 245.1927) and 
“all officers and employees of the Liquor Control Board” were further cautioned 
“against giving information to the public, newspaper representatives etc, relative to any 
matter whatsoever pertaining to the affairs of the stores, breweries or brewery 
warehouses”(LCBO Circular 432.1928). To do so would be in violation of “Sections 76, 
92, 101 and 103 of the Liquor Control Act” resulting in dismissal and possible 
incarceration (LCBO Circular 245.1927). Newspapers were noticeably upset by the 
LCBO’s lack of openness and reported retorts from vendors stating that any information 
they were given from Head Office was “for [their] own information and for none else”
(The Ottawa Citizen. Officials Silent on Liquor Law Details. June 3^  ̂1927).
The functioning of the LCBO was in fact so secretive that access was even 
denied to the provincial government until an official inquiry was launched in 1934. To 
the surprise of the Inquiry the LCBO kept no “record of any of its operations, resolutions 
or decisions at its official meetings” and their chief secretary, under oath, stated 
repeatedly that he was not invited to Board meetings or asked to make or keep any such 
records (Ross. 1936:3).
In order to fill the role of “capable men” the Province drew from the business 
elite such men as Harry Sheppard, the former chairman of the board of IBM Canada, Sir 
Henry Drayton, a former federal railways minister, R. D. Waugh, a former League of 
Nations commissioner, among others (Heron.2003:278). What this meant for the LCBO
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was the incorporation of state of the art tabulating and sorting machines as well as the 
savvy of public relation initiatives, advanced business practices and, of course, corporate 
connections.
Moral Control Through Surveillance
In the early years the Board understood that it needed to play a vital role in 
convincing a skeptical public that profit making through the sale of liquor could come 
without the exploitation of the poor and weak. To this end Ferguson boasted that the 
Board would always know “exactly who is buying and how much, and what disposition 
is being made of it” (Ferguson. 1927:3). When faced with Ferguson’s tremendous task of 
individualized liquor control in Ontario, the LCBO’s business administration of 
“capable men” turned to forms of control that were known to them, namely, the 
“standardization, monitoring, record keeping and statistical analysis” that were “the 
cornerstones of bureaucratic surveillance and control of the labour process” in the 
private sector (Gandy 1993:86).
The LCBO’s control method was based on two needs. First, it needed to discover 
and deny privilege to those individuals who lacked the self-discipline necessary for 
“responsible” drinking. These individuals posed an incredible risk to the Board by 
showing the public consequences of exploitation and addiction; and second, it needed to 
maintain panoptic control over those individuals who did maintain a sufficient degree of 
self-discipline. One can perhaps simplify the social function of the LCBO’s surveillance 
and control policies as risk avoidance and the creation of docile bodies - Foucault’s
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concept of individuals living in a state of “habituated anticipatory conformity”
(Foucault. 1977; Norris and Armstrong. 1999:6).
From the first purchases in 1927 forward, the LCBO developed an elaborate 
Head Office bureaucracy with up-to-the-minute proto-computer systems employing 
sophisticated administrative surveillance of point-of-purchase consumption of alcohol 
that makes today’s computerized gathering of personal information from consumers 
look amateurish. From 1927-1962 the LCBO limited those who were legally allowed to 
drink by requiring a permit to purchase liquor. These permits required an application to 
the Liquor Board which would then grant or deny requests based on “fitness” to drink 
and “character” (LCA 1927. s.37.4. and s.44). The permit book resembled a passport in 
size and shape and was individually identifiable through a unique six-digit number. The 
pages inside consisted of a small section of personal information, including name, 
address and employment, and another for records of purchases, including the date, liquor 
type, volume and cost. This tracking of every Ontarian’s liquor purchases allowed the 
LCBO to live up to Ferguson’s original mandate of "knowing exactly who is buying and 
how much.”
Between 1929 and 1933 these permits, along with investigations by the LCBO 
and Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), allowed the LCBO to generate over 154,000 
detailed files on Ontario residents that included financial, employment and family data. 
This data was used to gauge the “fitness” of drinkers and also shared with other state and 
police institutions. The LCBO even had the controversial right to grant police search 
warrants and the ability to convert private property such as homes or places of business 
into public spaces under the Liquor Control Act. By 1946 the LCBO’s job of tracking
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sales and permit holders became so large and complex that it started to rely on the punch 
card tabulation machines of IBM and other companies in order to process results.
Conclusion
The LCBO was made from a historical mixture of political necessity, coiporate 
methods of social control and unquestionable legal power. As this data shows the LCBO 
cannot be simply understood as a business administration for the sale of liquor, but must 
be conceptualized as an institution entrusted with a very serious moral mandate and 
social control function based on the morality and prejudices of the temperance 
movement. It is important to keep this point in mind when reading the remainder of this 
text as the themes of strict liquor control, the fanatical presentation of good social 
conditions, and the shadow of the temperance movement can be seen in all Board policy 
and action. The LCBO became a switching point, an early generator of and distributor of 
specialized data for social control organizations such as the police agencies and welfare 
services (see Ericson and Haggerty. 1997).
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Chapter 2
Self-Control: The LCBO and Panopticism
O f all kinds o f control, the best is self-control 
-LCBO Circular 497, October 10^^ 1928
In a circular on the topic of controlling abuses of liquor privileges sent to all 
vendors at both the LCBO stores and brewery warehouses, the Board emphasised that 
“of all kinds of control, the best is self-control”(LCBO Circular 49.1928). With this in 
mind Board policy focussed on allowing individual users to see the ills of their ways so 
that they could change their own behaviour. This was conceptualized as achievable, for 
those capable of self-control, through heavy surveillance of individual purchases and 
consumption. The Board argued that technologies that made visible drinking behaviour 
were necessary in order “to directly bring home to those purchasing liquor the amount of 
money they are spending on luxuries, possibly to the expense of real necessities”, thus 
allowing individuals the chance to control themselves with only minimal external force 
(LCBO Fourth Annual Report 1929-1930.1930:9).
Foucault’s analysis of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon in Discipline and Punish is 
directly relivant for this study (1977). From his brother’s works on Russian industrial 
discipline, Bentham developed the concept of the Panopticon as a prison for a new age 
(Los.2004:15). Arguably more humane than the prisons of the time, the Panopticon 
brought prisoners out of darkness and obscurity into visibility and light. The proposed 
Panopticon would consist of a ring-shaped structure with cells arranged so that they 
would have large windows on both the exterior and interior of the building. On the 
exterior wall the first window would create backlighting for the cell, while the window 
on the interior wall would allow for viewing the prisoner and the cell’s entire contents.
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At the centre of the ring-like structure would be an inspection tower where the guard, or 
guardian of the prison, would be able to view all the prisoners within their cells. The 
windows and lighting would play a crucial role in the building by allowing the prisoner 
to be seen by the central tower at all times. This ever present gaze, Bentham argued, 
would be the only regulatory tool needed since the prisoner would be constantly aware 
that the guardian may be watching and, having internalized his gaze, cease 
contemplating unacceptable acts. Bentham also believed strongly that the prisoner must 
be unable to detect when he was under the eye of the guardian. Knowing, Bentham felt, 
would limit the “correction” of behaviour to when the prisoner knew he was under 
surveillance; so, to this end, Bentham conceived of an elaborate mixture of blinds, 
tunnels and lighting fixtures that would allow for the prisoner to be always seen without 
ever being able to varify the guardian's presence (Bentham in Foucault 1977:200-201).
Bentham took this concept one step further when he speculated about the 
necessity of the guardian at all. Once it was established that a guardian was watching, 
then any person occupying the tower, regardless of position or education, could play the 
necessary role. He even went as far as to explain that the regulatory effect of the 
guardian’s gaze could even be accomplished through a system of moving shadows. Like 
the ghosts that Bentham had feared in his own life, only the perception of the existence 
of the guardian mattered, and not the reality (Himmelfarb. 1966). Regardless of the 
actual or possible existence of an observing guardian, his role of generating a reforming 
gaze could be obtained through the mere possibility of his presence within the inspection 
tower.
Unlike Bentham, Foucault did not see the Panopticon necessarily as a physical 
structure. Foucault envisioned the Panopticon as more than simply a physical structure.
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He understood it as a structure of social relations designed to alter human behaviour 
through the perception of constant surveillance. Panoptic social organization, he argued, 
“thanks to its mechanisms of observation, gains in efficiency and ability to penetrate into 
men’s behaviour” (Foucault. 1977:204), forcing them into a form of self-discipline 
through which “the individual is carefully fabricated” to fit within the moral and legal 
rules of the society (Ibid:217). In the end, Foucault argues, this form of power succeeds 
to produce what he calls “docile bodies”, that is, individuals living in a state of 
“habituated anticipatory conformity” (Norris and Armstrong. 1999:6).
In the case of the LCBO, surveillance mechanisms embedded within the 
purchase process were used to instil the necessary characteristics of Panopticism 
(Foucault. 1977:195-228) for both the permit holding public and the LCBO staff. The 
purchase process involved three main pieces of disciplinary technology: the individual 
liquor permit book, the purchase form and the vendor stamp. When a permit holder, or 
permittee, wanted to purchase liquor fi-om a Board store all three of these technologies 
came into play. First, a purchase form would be filled out containing the type of liquor 
requested, amount of liquor requested, the date and the individual’s permit book number 
(LCA. 1927.S.32. l,s.32.2). Then the individual’s permit book would be checked to see 
that purchases had not reached an excessive level. If the level was deemed acceptable by 
the vendor, then the new purchase would be added to the individual liquor permit book, 
the purchase form would be signed by the purchaser and finally both would be stamped 
by the LCBO vendor (LCBO Vendor Instructions, 1927:3). Since each of these 
technologies were embedded within all legal liquor interactions, and all were 
individually numbered, they acted as surveillance tools applied to both liquor permittees 
and LCBO store staff.
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Liquor Permits
“The major effect of the Panopticon,” Foucault (1977: 201) argued, was “to 
induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the 
automatic functioning of power”. For individual liquor users the Permit Book would 
play a central role in creating the conscious state of “permanent visibility” needed to 
induce self-discipline. The Liquor Permit Books were introduced by the LCBO in 
Ontario in 1927 under the conditions of the Liquor Control Act. The permit book 
resembled a passport in size and shape and was individually and geographically 
identifiable through a unique six digit number. The pages inside consisted of a small 
section related to the individual, including name, address and employment, and another 
for records of purchases. The liquor permit books were required to purchase liquor for 
home consumption and, upon purchase, the date, liquor type, volume and cost were 
recorded, allowing for surveillance and classification of all users along these parameters.
FIGURE 2-1. Liquor Permit Book 1927-1958
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The Liquor Permit Books were acquired by application if one was twenty-one 
years of age, a resident of Ontario for one month or more (visitors applied under another 
category), and of “good” character; specifically, one could not be an “Indian” already 
disqualified through the LCBO’s own sorts, “by an order of cancellation or interdiction” 
(LCA. 1927. s.37.4.,s.44,s.95-l; LCBO Manual of Instructions to Vendors. 1952:20). 
Applicants were then required to obtain a permit application form, fill it out and have an 
individual appointed by the Board verify their identity and character (Liquor Control 
Act. SO. s.37.2; LCBO Form 85; Instructions to Vendors. 1927). Two copies of the 
permit were created through the application process, one was sent to the Permit 
Department of the LCBO, to be known as “second copies”, and the other was given to 
the customer, to be presented upon each purchase (Sec.66 . Regulations of the LCBO, 
1927). A fee of two dollars was required. The Liquor Permit Book was valid for twelve 
months, fi-om November 1st of one year to October 31st of the next. Afl:er this time the 
permit had to be replaced and another two dollars paid to the LCBO.
Since each purchase required the permittee’s Liquor Permit Book to be 
scrupulously reviewed for “over consumption,” “misspending of income,” previous 
LCBO disciplinary action and more generally any “abuse of the permit privilege” by the 
local vendor, surveillance and review were core factors of purchasing alcohol (LCBO 
Circular 333, April 18th 1928; LCBO Manual of Instructions to Vendors. 1952:44-45; 
LCBO Vendors’ Instructions. 1927:1). Not only could the data within the permit books 
be reviewed by the Board, individuals were made aware that they might also be 
inspected upon request by police officers, courts, aid organizations or municipalities 
without a warrant (Regulations of the LCBO. s. 101.1927). In some cases. Liquor Permit
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Books acted as evidence of character in criminal cases and civil proceedings leading to 
con\dctions and imprisonment (LCBO Circular 1952.1938; LCBO Circular 3621.1945; 
Thompson v Thompson. 1933). ̂  In this sense the technology of the liquor Permit Book 
acts analogically as a kind of backlighting that in both historical and contemporary terms 
of reference makes individual users visible. If this wasn’t enough to instill self- 
discipline, the Board also issued disciplinary letters under a wide variety of conditions to 
inform permittees that their liquor use was under "investigation" and that they were to 
take this into consideration when exercising their purchase privilege (LCBO Warning 
Letter. 1969). These letters underlined that a lack of self-control had been observed and 
as a result the level of individual surveillance had been intensified.
Other Permit Books
Like Panoptic cells the LCBO arranged its permit system so that no liquor 
consumption escaped its gaze or existed outside its exercise of power. Liquor Permit 
Books also existed for the specified categories of “Visitors,” “Physicians,” “Druggists,” 
“Dentists and Veterinary Surgeons,” “Manufacturers,” “Mechanics and Scientifics,” 
“Ministers of the Gospel,” and “Hospitals.” Each category had its own regulations 
regarding the possession and purchase of liquor, though like the individual permit books, 
all had to record the amount of alcohol purchased and in some cases to whom the 
alcohol was administered (Liquor Control Act S.0.1927. s.56-60).
1 Thompson v. Thompson. (1933) “Liquor Control Board, Toronto: Thompson I.e. Thompson - Divorce 
Action - As To Board's Officers Giving Information In Court About Amount Of Liquor Bought.” Attorney 
General Central Registry Criminal and Civil Files, RG 4-32 series. Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
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FIGURE 2-2. LCBO L-33 Special Permit Purchase Record
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As Foucault (1977:199) noted, panoptic “authorities exercising individual 
control function according to a double mode, that of binary division and branding.” For 
the LCBO the Permit Book was initially a means of classifying the legal liquor-using 
population, since it was needed for purchasing liquor legally, but it was also developed 
to categorize populations that would have reduced access to liquor. When a permittee’s 
drinking behaviour became suspect or “in the case of those who really require the closest 
supervision,” the local vendor affixed to the user’s liquor permit a “Regional 
Stamp”(LCBO Circular 829.1929). This Regional Stamp would then make the 
permittee’s liquor permit only valid in a single store. This was done so that the vendor 
would be in a position of “knowing all about [the permittee] and their circumstances,” 
thus increasing the visibility of the subject and the intensity of the instructional gaze. 
Vendors were instructed by Head Office to use the Regional Stamp liberally, “to stamp 
all permits under suspicion, but as yet uncollected, so as to make such permits good 
only...where the permittee is known”(Ibid); thus rendering visible and fixing in
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geographic space the user’s opportunities for contact with the LCBO.
Those who were deemed in need of “limited consumption” as well as those 
refused liquor outright were also included in the stamped category (LCBO 941.1930). If 
a vendor felt that a permittee was over-consuming liquor they were to stamp the permit 
with the Regional Stamp and “write on the permit the quantity of beer [or liquor] per 
week to which he considers such permittee should be restricted” (Ibid). Refiisals were 
also included in the “stamped” category. A permittee could be refused and classified as 
regionally stamped for either attempting to purchase liquor while intoxicated or if the 
vendor felt that the permittee had made “excessive purchases or an unreasonable amount 
of money [was] being spent” (LCBO 403.1928). Further, page thirteen of the Liquor 
Permit Book would be marked by vendors with red capital letter “R ”s in each column of 
the purchase section, and like the criminal masks once proposed by Bentham (1995), it 
made their deviancy plain for all to see . Not only would the labeled individuals become 
more self aware of their classification, Bentham argued that:
with regard to the spectators, the salutary impression, instead of being 
weakened, will be heightened, by this imagery. The scene of devotion will 
be decorated by -  why mince the word? -  by a masquerade: a masquerade, 
indeed, but of what kind? Not a gay and dangerous, but a serious, affecting, 
and instructive one (Ibid: 100).
The imposed classification of the Regional Stamp making permittees limited to one store 
where they were “known,” and making the vendor personally responsible for the 
permittee’s “purchases of liquors,” exposed them to a locus of disciplinary oversight on 
both parameters (LCBO Circular 829.1929). These restrictions were even passed from 
old to new permits unless the permittee could “be trusted now to apply self
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controI”(LCBO Circular 1167.1930).
Permit books ultimately made visible the purchases of all individuals not only to 
the LCBO but also to any family member, friend, acquaintance or familiar that happened 
to be standing nearby in the LCBO store line. The legitimate administrative reach of the 
Permit Book through warning letters, regional stamps or symbolic markings also 
suffered from illegitimate spillage. LCBO circulars contain several accounts of how the 
exposure of purchase data of certain “respectable individuals” had lead to public 
humiliation and angry letters to Head Office (LCBO Circular 759.1929; LCBO Circular 
3833.1947). In a case in 1929 it was reported that the questioning of an individual’s 
spending habits had resulted in “tittering” and “sneering” by the vendor and other 
permittees (LCBO Circular 759.1929). Though the Board felt that the humiliation 
caused by the limitation of an individual’s purchases was inevitable, it reminded its 
vendors that “certmn law-abiding citizens are very unnecessarily humiliated in front of 
the public when questioned about the amount of purchases on their permit” and that 
“frequently fine, worthy men apart from a weakness for liquor are among those limited 
and we want those men not to be slighted on entering a store” (LCBO Circular 
3833.1947; LCBO Circular 759.1929).
Administrative technologies inducing self-discipline may be further studied in 
the orders of permit cancellation and prohibition issued by the LCBO. From 1927-1962, 
the historical period that the individual liquor permit was in place, 5.9% of all 
individuals that wrote the Board to cancel a permit privilege requested to cancel their 
own. (This percentage would increase to 7.9% if one includes letters written on official
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police letterhead or signed as witnessed by police officers).^ In terms of real numbers, 
personal requests for cancellation statistically would have accounted for over 46,000
individual prohibition orders between 1927 and 1962? These personal requests often 
cited that liquor was affecting their financial resources or that they lacked personal 
control, mirroring exactly the Board’s moral concern and often even the language. One 
vendor described the docility of permittees in these encounters:
Usually a liquor addict realizes his failing and does not resent kindly, well- 
placed words. Many have visited my office and whilst I am frank with them, they 
appreciate kindly intent and usually leave promising to exercise self control and 
thanking me (LCBO Circular 497.1928).
Many drinkers did not conform to this ideal of politeness. The LCBO circulars are 
riddled with accounts of methods used by permittees to disrupt power relations. Most of 
these revolved around attempts to disrupt the state of permanent visibility either by 
manipulating the disciplinary technologies or attempting to control their surveillance 
record through the use of other’s permits or stamps (LCBO Circular 194.1927; LCBO 
Circular 519. 1928; LCBO Circular 3621.1945). These acts, the LCBO argued.
2 Numbers were tabulated from the existing 51 orders dating 1927-1962 in The Interdiction List of the 
Liquor Licence Board. RG-36-13. The Archives of Ontario. Toronto.
 ̂Calculated from the total number of recipients of Orders of Cancellation and Prohibition from 1927- 
1962 as published in the Annual Reports of the LCBO 1927-1962 in accordance statistics on the 
percentage of orders derived through letters to the Board (Lang and Me Neely. 1963) and with statistics 
generated through a personal analysis of the letters to the Board found in the Interdiction List of the 
Liquor Licence Board. RG-36-13 at the Archives of Ontario.
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reinforced its intrusive surveillance and called for more vigilance in its staff in their 
attempts at “thwarting trickery of the kind described”(LCBO Circular 666.1929). The 
data collected by the LCBO through the liquor permit had very real consequences for its 
users. Not only was this data used in criminal and civil cases, but it was also used 
internally at the LCBO in order to categorise and control users (LCBO Circular 
1952.1938, LCBO Circular 3621.1945).
Permit Cards
Beginning in 1958 the LCBO altered their permits by removing the section for 
recording purchases. By this time the speed and accuracy of the Board’s IBM tabulating 
and sorting technology had finally allowed for the physical separation of the individual 
from the collected database without a decline in the vividness of surveillance. The new 
Liquor Permit Card (see FIGURE 2-3) acted like contemporary documentary tokens, in 
that they were a means of connecting individuals and their purchases to the relevant 
databases (Rule, McAdam, Steams and Uglow 1983:222).
FIGURE 2-3. Liquor Permit Card 1957-1962
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This separation allowed the Board to eliminate its costly permit books and 
remove from sight their surveillance and classification methods. However, the 
consequence was that the LCBO’s ability to produce a constant sense of surveillance 
was removed and the concept of the individual’s self-disciplining role was eliminated 
from official policy. The separation also ushered in new social relations surrounding the 
document as the sophistication of the token/database relationship led to social control 
methods along more contemporary consumer formats such as age of majority cards, and 
smart ID cards (Lyon 2001; Gandy 1987). In 1962 the permit system was abandoned 
and the LCBO relied solely on their “Purchase Form” to review purchases and 
consumption until it too was abandoned when stores became self-serve and liquor 
appeared on the shelves.
Purchase Form and Vendor Stamp
From 1927 until the late 1970's a permittee when purchasing liquor filled in a 
“Purchase Order Form”. This form contained a formal declaration of a request for liquor 
and was signed by the permit holder; it included the type of liquor requested, amounts, 
the date and the individual’s permit book number. These forms were reviewed by store 
vendors or permit endorsers along with the Liquor Permit, and if approved, the order 
would then be filled. The original purchase order forms were filed at LCBO Head Office 
in Toronto. In the early years purchase order forms were individually reviewed by hand 
for purchase anomalies, requiring in 1932 over 200 employees to undertake this detailed 
scrutiny (LCBO Vendors’ Instructions 1927:14; LCBO Circular 851.1929; Annual 
Reports of the LCBO 1927-1933).
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FIGURE 2-4. LCBO Form S-25, The Purchase Order Form
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The purchase order form served the main purpose of tracking consumption of particular 
liquor types but it also made possible the individual surveillance of vendors at the local 
level (LCBO Vendors’ Instructions. 1927:1-2). The original purchase order forms were 
filled out by staff at the Liquor Control Board stores, signed by the permittee, and then 
stamped “ENDORSED” with an individually numbered stamp, traceable to the local 
employee who filled the order. The Board issued individualized stamps to all staff and 
kept detailed records of who was “operating each stamp” as a means of vendor 
identification (LCBO Circular 557.1928). This they deemed necessary because 
individual stamps were the only means of identifying those involved in sale 
“irregularities” and therefore in need of disciplinary action (Ibid).
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The need for the conscious and permanent visibility of liquor consumption made 
the misuse of vendor’s stamps or the mislabeling of Liquor Permits “the most 
reprehensible practice” in the eyes of the Board and it was one of the few instances that 
merited “immediate dismissal” (LCBO Vendors’ Instructions. 1927:1-2; LCBO Circular
333.1928). Like permit holders who “abused their permit privilege”, individual vendors 
were subjected to disciplinary action and in some cases incarcerated based on the data 
collected through the purchase order forms (LCBO Circular 625.1929; LCBO Circular 
653.1929; Rex V. Brown. 1930, 55 C.C.C. 29). Even though purchase order forms were 
no longer sent to Head Office after 1934, they remained on file at the local store with the 
idea that they could be reviewed at any time by one of the Board’s many inspectors 
(LCBO Circular 1594.1934). The permit forms finally went out of use in the late 1970’s 
and early 1980’s when the LCBO stores became self-serve operations. Henceforth, "the 
moral" interests of the LCBO would be threefold: underage drinking, drinking and 
driving, and the effect of alcohol on pregnancy.
Conclusion
For the Board, the panoptic powers of the permit book, vendor stamps and 
purchase forms were highly successful means of achieving its social mandate of liquor 
control and the moral mandate of enforcing temperance values.
Though this form of liquor control was removed in the late 1970's and early 
1980's the concept behind the permit system of control has experienced a resurgence 
within the LCBO in recent years with the development of its own high technology BYID 
card as well as data mining point-of-purcfiase information like “Air
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Miles”(LCB0.2006). Information Technology employed in this way is presented as a 
means of public good and safety. It is the tried and true route for the Board, and others 
assuming its role, to achieve the monumental task presented to it in 1927; to be in a 
position of “knowing exactly who is buying and how much”.
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Chapter 3
A Kind of Prohibition Part 1: Social Sorting in Ontario
Those who can ‘take liquor ' decently shall have it, and that others shall not have it- so 
as far as it goes, this is a kind ofprohibition too. In the Feguson Government's Papers 
Concerning the Temperance Question in Ontario. F8 MU 1029. The Archives o f 
Ontario. Toronto
Oscar Gandy(1993:17) in his work The Panoptic Sort argues that social sorts act 
as “primarily a defensive technology” designed to reduce risk through the identification 
and removal of “sure losers” from the general population . For the LCBO this meant the 
sorting out of people whose potential for intemperance posed too great a risk to their 
organization. During the early years the LCBO was hanging by a thread, the temperance 
movement was politically strong and the Board needed to show that state liquor control 
worked. The Board expressed strongly to its workers that they had the “success of the 
law in their hands” and that they were active in “preventing discredit falling upon the 
store system through immoderation or other wrongdoing by permit holders” (LCBO 
Circular 497, 382.1928; LCBO Instructions to Vendors Regarding the Issuing 
Permits. 1928:5). This, coupled with intensive surveillance technologies, resulted in a 
system of pre-elimination for individuals deemed by the Board to be lacking the 
necessary self-control needed to be trusted with the privilege of drinking liquor. 
Individuals, for reasons such as income, race or reputation, were determined by the 
Board to be simply lacking the moral control necessary to combat the evils of drink and 
thus, according to the Board’s mandate, needed to be identified and eliminated from the 
drinking population (Willison. 1924; Ferguson. 1926). To this end the Board engaged in 
an extensive province-wide social sort to identify, assess and classify individuals based 
on their perceived risk of intemperance. Those who were seen as too great a risk, were
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not given the chance to “create prejudice against the law” and were kept from acquiring 
liquor by being listed on the “drunk” or “Interdicted” list (LCBO Circular 497.1928).
Punch Cards and Hollerith Technology
Complex sorts in pre-computer age circa 1927 were undertaken with Hollerith 
sorting and tabulating machines. Hollerith machines were cutting edge technology in the 
1920's and accepted as a “prove[n] way of economically producing facts and figures 
vital to operating” a business (Railway Review 1926:354). The punch card and sorter 
were invented by Herman Hollerith as a means of having “a machine for doing the 
purely mechanical work of tabulating population and similar statistics” and “to count 
people like they had never been counted before” (Alterman 1969:5; Black.2001:24). 
This technology was first used in 1886 in Baltimore to generate public health statistics, 
though it is perhaps better known for its tabulation of the 1890 United States census or 
its sorting and subjugation of targeted populations in Nazi Germany and occupied 
Europe (Norberg. 1990:761; Black.2001). This technology was unique in that it was 
designed to “identify the victims” but it also provided data that could “project and 
rationalize the benefits of their destruction, organize their persecution, and even audit 
[its own] efficiency” (Black.2001 ;8). The LCBO incorporated this technology primarily 
to identify and track users, and as the technology delivered more vivid descriptions of 
populations it used its statistical analysis to socially justify the pre-elimination of 
potentially dangerous populations (Annual Report of the LCBO 1958-1959. 1959). 
Although the Tabulating Machine Company (soon to become IBM), under the gaze of 
Hollerith, was the first to patent punch card technology, many companies developed
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variations on Hollerith’s original design. By 1925 punch card technology had been 
standardized around a 12 row, 80 column design which remained unaltered until punch 
cards ceased being mass-produced (see Figure 3-1 below),
FIGURE 3-1. Standardised 80 Column Punch Card
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These standardized cards allowed for both numeric and alphabetic data to be 
stored and sorted. Sorting of the cards themselves was conducted by feeding the card 
into a sorting machine whose key components consisted of a brush, or card reader, and a 
mechanism to direct the card into one of the 13 pockets of the card sorting machine.
FIGURE 3-2. How the Sorter Sorts Punch Cards
Bruih
4 Punch \
'  Card '
C ir c u i t '-
The sorter pockets were arranged 9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0,11,12 and R, with the 
thirteenth or “R” pocket being for unreadable or reject cards. As the card passed through 
the machine a brush was used to detect the position punched in the card. When the brush
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passed over the punched hole it completed a circuit that forced the card upward along a 
metal path that lead to the corresponding pocket. The alphabetic information required 
two punched holes in a single column, with two passes through the sorting machine. On 
the second pass pockets 9-1 were turned off allowing the machine to read only the 
punched positions in either the 0, 11 or 12 position. This second pass finalized the 
alphabetical ordering of the punch cards. The IBM 80 sorter of 1925 could sort and 
tabulate between 250-2000 cards per minute (IBM 1961:28).
From 1927 to 1964 the LCBO used punch card technology at its Head Office. 
The Board relied on both Dominion Loose Leaf Company Limited and Remington 
Rand’s Kardex Visible division for tabulation services from 1927-1943, but in 1944 
changed exclusively to IBM Hollerith tabulating machines to record purchases, tabulate 
consumption and sort individual permittees and keep detailed records of all permit users 
(Annual Report of the LCB01944-1945.1945).
FIGURE 3-3. LCBO IBM 83700 Secondary Permit 1946
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NB: Though the Board started using the IBM 60652 Card as their sole means of recording secondary 
permits in 1948, they had already been using the technology to perform permit tracking as early as 1944 
(Circular 3940.1948: LCBO IBM 60652). The IBM 83700 card worked as a prototype for the IBM 60652 
that was incorporated as the secondary permit in 1948.
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The IBM 83700 contained the permittee’s address, permit number, the store and vendor 
from whom the permit was purchased but most importantly it included a punched 
section for the individual’s name. This punched section would allow for simple 
classification of individuals as well as allow for the expedient generation of lists - the 
LCBO’s most valuable tool in controlling liquor sales. Like most of IBM’s clients the 
LCBO’s punch cards would “be sent to the service bureau of the International Business 
Machines to be punched” and then returned to the Board’s Permit Department “for 
machine sorting” (LCBO Circular 3940.1948). The Board extensively sorted and 
tabulated products and users and reported more positive findings in their annual reports 
to the Ontario government.
The Board used IBM punch cards, like the one shown above, to play the role of 
the secondary permit that was held at head office. These secondary permits provided 
information that allowed the Board to keep tabs on problem users so that previous 
restrictions such as “Limited Consumption” (described in chapter 2) would be retained 
by the permittee should they attempt to receive a new permit (LCBO Circular
859.1929). The Penrnt Department of the LCBO was quite adamant about the “Second 
Copies” as they were its sole means of tracking and classifying users (LCBO Circulars 
226, 873, 1439, 1442, 1534, 1636, 3442, 3940. 1927-1948). The Board separated 
permits by geographical location and used their second copy punch cards as a means of 
generating the LCBO’s many lists, counting permit types and conducting statistical 
analysis aimed at eliminating problem users from those eligible to purchase hquor.
In 1944 the Board spent over $141,000 implementing its new IBM technology and by 
1952 spUt their tabulation and IBM rental costs so that each could pass under 2% of the 
LCBO’s gross profit (Annual Reports of the LCBO 1944-1945.1945; see Figure 8
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below).
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One can see from the increased use of tabulation machines and the vast 
operational costs that the LCBO paid, the central role and scope that these technologies 
played. By 1970 the Board had paid IBM over $764,000 for equipment rental, $1,083,00 
in tabulation costs, $1,061,000 in permit costs, $190,000 for computerization making a 
grand total of $3,099,300 dollars spent on surveillance technologies over 26 years.
The role of IBM in the development of sorting and tabulating technologies at the LCBO 
after 1944 was substantial. But not only IBM technology was introduced, executive 
personnel were also sourced from Big Blue. Harry Sheppard became chief commissioner 
of the LCBO in 1963 after stepping down from his position as chairman of the board of 
IBM Canada. Sheppard immediately initiated a program of computerization of the Board
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when he took his position at the LCBO - trading up from punch cards to PCs starting in 
1963. After the infusion of IBM technology into the LCBO, statistical sorting became 
central to the identification and investigation of risk populations as well as the key 
technology used for the generation of the Board’s most powerful social control tool - the 
“drunk” lists.
Classification o f “Problem Users ” and the LCBO Lists
At first, LCBO regulations pre-selected three main groups for exclusion: the First 
Nations and Inuit peoples defined as “Indians” under the Indian Act, minors, and 
interdicted individuals, (those to whom alcohol was barred due to judicial action). But 
with increased knowledge gathered through the permit books, purchase forms, statistical 
analysis and investigations, the “drunk list” quickly expanded.
As part of its temperance morality mandate the Board instructed its vendors to 
watch out for those who “abused liquor,” “those who from the amount of their purchases 
and from their standing and circumstances are likely to be supplying bootleggers,” and 
those whose financial standing “is such that the sales must be followed by a diminution 
of the comforts of life in the family”, so that they could be barred from liquor use 
(LCBO Circular 1766,1936; Liquor Control Act 1927 S O c.70 s.257). Initially, the 
Board relied on the older “Interdiction List,” a remnant of British black listing laws that 
eliminated drunkenness by circulating the name and likeness of listed individuals. By 
1928 this method was considered too cumbersome a tool for social control given the 
magnitude of the task at hand. The justice system was simply not fast enough to process 
the LCBO’s average of 38,486 investigations per year (Annual Report o f the LCBO
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1929-1933). Placing someone on the Interdicted List was a lengthy process; one was 
sentenced by a judge in open court, and few judges opted to include interdiction in 
sentences. Between 1927 and 1976 only 23 judges actually chose to interdict offenders, 
and only 6  of them did so more than once in their careers (RG-36-13 Interdiction
Records of the LLBO^). To bypass this time consuming process the Board initiated what 
it called the “Cancellation List” to quickly and definitively deal with its problem users 
(Annual Reports of the LCBO 1927-1928.1928).
Individuals listed on the Cancellation List had no conceptual or legal distinction 
fi-om those who were formally interdicted by a judge. Their names and likenesses were 
sent to all vendors, police, and afl;er 1934 to standard hotels, on the very same lists as 
those who were legally interdicted. These lists were updated through letters for each 
individual added to the fist and fully replaced monthly by the Board. As more vivid data 
on permit holders was collected by the LCBO, it became apparent that the Cancellation 
List was a limited means of keeping problem drinking populations firom receiving 
permits and the “drunk” list was expanded yet again (LCBO Circular 904,1930).
The “Prohibited List” was formally developed in 1929 to replace the 
Cancellation List because the Board decided to track and pre-eliminate those individuals 
who where reportedly receiving "relief fi"om municipalities (Annual Report of the 
LCBO 1928-1929. 1929:3). Permit cancellation was not an acceptable solution since 
intemperate actions had already occurred and the validity of the law already damaged. 
Through surveillance and analysis the Board sought means of predicting which
 ̂ Interdiction legislation moved under the control of the LLBO in 1976, which is why Interdiction orders 
and supporting documents that were the property of the LCBO are currently archived under the title 
Interdiction Records o f the LLBO in the RG-36-13 series. Data in this paper was restricted to LCBO files 
dating from 1927-1976.
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individuals would prove intemperate and pre-eliminate these “dangerous” persons. The 
LCBO was sent lists of relief recipients through the offices of charity organizations, 
municipalities, as well as from the general public, and then conducted their own 
investigations into whether or not these individuals had been issued a liquor permit or 
warranted the privilege of having one. Ultimately, the Board used this new list, gathered 
through file matching, to exclude drinkers for a wide variety of reasons under what were 
called “preventative cancellations,” arguing that, based on data they had collected, 
revoking some peoples' permits had become an inevitability (LCBO Circular 904,1930). 
By 1933, over 150,000 people had been investigated by the Board and over 10,000 were 
placed on the Prohibited List.
FIGURE 3-5. The LCBO’s Interdiction / Prohibited List 
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Although the Board sent out complete lists to its stores, it listed individuals by 
district. Historically, the rural regions of the province were thought to be sites of heavy 
drinking by those with weaker morals. As one temperance official argued to Premier 
Ferguson, this was attributable to the fact that such populations “were made up by Jews, 
foreigners...Roman Catholics” and of course, though left unsaid, “Indians” (Oliver 
1975:163). The Northern district saw higher rates of interdiction and was over­
represented on the Interdiction List (The Interdiction List of the Liquor Licence Board 
RG-36-13). To the LCBO these northern populations posed a great risk, and it was often 
cited that the Interdiction / Prohibition List was of great importance especially in the 
Northern district (Annual Report of the LCBO 1958-1959,1959; Annual Report of the 
LCBO 1972-1973.1973).
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Monthly lists were also supplemented with additional names through a standard 
form distributed from Head Office. At the top, the affected establishments were listed, 
while at the bottom copies of this list updates were recorded as sent to the LCBO’s local 
hotel inspector, the local standard hotels, legions, LCBO stores and the Chief Inspector 
of the Ontario Provincial Police. With this list came official copies of the order of 
interdiction or prohibition as well as a form detailing the restricted individual’s age, 
appearance, employment, marital status, previous police histoiy and preference, or 
weakness, in alcohol (See LCBO Individual Record Form below). In later years these 
forms were also supplemented with a picture of the listed individual.
FIGURE 3-7. LCBO Individual Record Form
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This detailed “individual record” gave local vendors a better chance of 
identifying permit abusers - a problem primarily in larger centers where vendors may 
not know each customer personally (LCBO 829.1929). These forms were initially filled 
by the LCBO’s inspectors or those investigating an individual for interdiction, and were 
designed to positively identify listed individuals. Over the years the form was altered 
slightly, yet the information it contained remained the same until the enforcement 
department of the LCBO was absorbed by the LLBO in 1976.
Individual files were also kept on listed individuals and contained detailed 
information gathered through LCBO investigations. Data within these files came from a 
wide variety of sources including letters and interviews with relatives, doctors, priests 
and neighbours as well as judges orders, photos, police, hospital and court records. 
Some files even contained confidential personal information like medical records or 
records of participation in Alcoholics Anonymous programs. These files were kept at 
Head Office and allocated Investigation and Classification Cards that allowed readers to 
quickly identify the materials and previous action taken by aid of a prohibited persons 
classification system.
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FIGURE 3-8. LCBO Investigation and Classification Card.
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The Board had eight possible classifications; Full Board Order 1 year (FBO), 
Full Board Order Until Further Notice (FN), Limited (HC and LA), Premise Declared 
Public Place (PP and HCPP) and Judge’s Order of Interdiction (J). Each of these 
classifications had different implications for the user with a wide range of severity. 
“Board Order” meant orders of prohibition, or orders to have individuals added to the 
prohibited list. Most orders of prohibition listed someone for the period of one year, 
though the Board could place the order until further notice at its own discretion. The 
Board also had two less consequential forms of classification: “partial orders” or 
“limited permits” that stipulated either no home consumption (HC) or no drinking in
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licensed establishments such as standard hotels or authorities such as Union or Legion 
Halls (LA). In instances where the Board had seized liquor from a private residence, it 
could add to the order a stipulation that converted the individual’s private property into a 
public place under the Liquor Control Act (R.S.O. 1927 17 Geo. V. c.257.s.42.(2)). On 
the LCBO’s investigation and classification card this appeared as “PP” for a simple 
conversion and “HCPP” for the conversion of a residence.
Under section 42.2(2) of the Liquor Control Act an individual on the prohibited 
list could have their private residence converted into a public place, and the LCBO 
tracked this as well (SO 1927 c.70.s.42.(2)). The section stipulates that a residence, 
defined as “any building or part of a building or tent where a person resides,” can be 
converted into a public place, defined as “any place building or convenience to which 
the public has, or is permitted to have, access” (Ibid). These orders were designed to 
eliminate the need for the police or LCBO investigators to obtain a search warrant for a 
converted premise and also made it illegal for anyone to consume liquor on the 
premises. Conversion was limited to those who underwent a legal process, starting with 
their conviction for any breach of the Liquor Control Act within the residence where 
there was “liquor kept therein” or “removed therefrom” (Ibid). Between 1939 and 1947 
over 3,400 residences in Ontario were converted to public property and although this 
remained a part of law from 1927 until the late 1960's, the Board only published data 
from 1939-1947.
The conversion of a residence to a public place would last a stipulated period, 
usually one year from the date of the conviction, unless removed by the Board. The 
residence, regardless of ownership, would remain a public place, even if the convicted 
person moved, until the Board was “satisfied of a bona fide change in ownership or
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occupation of such premise” (Ibid). Individuals on the Prohibited list would receive a 
supplementary postscript to their order stating “P.S. This action is taken pursuant to your 
conviction under section 43-1, L.C. A., and your premises having been declared a public 
place, rendering it illegal for anyone to hold a permit or keep or have possession of 
beverage liquor therein for [the stipulated period]” (LCBO Interdiction Order. RG-36- 
13).
Analysis o f Prohibited Lists
Individuals classified under the rubric of “Prohibitory Orders” - recipients of fiall 
or partial Board orders - were of particular importance to the maintenance of morality as 
they held the statistical key to predicting the intemperate actions of future potential 
liquor users and thus were the subject of complex analysis by LCBO Head Office. 
Throughout the 30's 40's and 50's the LCBO’s various lists served as the exclusive 
means of keeping permanent "tabs" on all "problem" cases (LCBO Circular 1167,1930).
Gandy (1993:74) points out how lists and list matching are of vital importance to 
organizations seeking to avoid risk because of their value in predicting which 
individuals will be “engaged in activities related to waste, fraud and abuse of resources”. 
In the case of the LCBO, the goal of predicting who would engage in acts of 
intemperance lead to a complex system of analysis that sought to target and label “risky” 
populations. Externally, the LCBO ran hst matching processes with city relief officials, 
aid organizations and several levels of police; while internally the Board relied on a 
system of hst matching that included geographical location, interdiction or order type, 
reason for interdiction (including race), as well as previous disciplinary action to 
identify potentially intemperate drinkers (see LCBO form L-44). An internal
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communication explained that these matches played a key role in the sorting and 
predictive capabilities of the Board (LCBO Circular 1167,1930).
FIGURE 3-9. LCBO L-44 Analysis of Prohibitory Orders.
ANALYSIS OF PROHIBrrORY ORDERS
Geographical Location
The LCBO’s numbering of permit books, stores, listed individuals, standard 
hotels and authority holders allowed for a detailed geographical analysis of the province. 
Although it was possible, through the Board’s various numbered systems, to track any 
individual, store or locality, most of its geographical statistical analysis involved 
separating the province into eight regions; Toronto (A), Eastern (B), Hamilton (C), 
Niagara Falls (D), Northern Ontario (E), Western Ontario No. 1 (F), Western Ontario 
No.2 (G) and Windsor District (H). The Board used these regions to analyze data on 
consumption as well as on listed individuals. Each section of the L44 form is separated 
by geographical region allowing for the assessment of category-specific risk.
Statistically, the Northern district was where the interdiction list served the greatest use
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and conversely posed the greatest risk (Annual Report of the LCBO 1958-1959.1959; 
Annual Report of the LCBOl972-1973.1973). From an analysis of the final remaining 
complete interdiction lists, the northern region is greatly over-represented as well as 
almost exclusively made up of First Nations peoples, showing the type of risk associated 
with the north (Interdiction Lists. 1927-1975).^ Region could, then, collapse racially 
defined pre-elimination into a georacial profile.
Past Disciplinary Action
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Past disciplinary action was a heavily weighted risk factor. Specific technologies 
such as the Investigation and Classification Card tracked past disciplinary action while 
list matching identified risk populations. Of those individuals investigated for 
interdiction 61% had previous disciplinary action while 29% had previously been 
formally interdicted (Interdiction Records of the LLBO. RG-36-13). Heavy drinkers 
posed a serious threat as they were the physical manifestations of the “exploitation” of 
the liquor trade (Spence. 1926). Vendors were continuously reminded that “the real 
addict should not have a permit at all” and they were to identify those habitual drinkers 
who “abused the liquor privilege”(LCBO 497.1928; LCBO Vendor Instructions. 1927).
^ The complete Interdiction list from 1927-1975 and the final distributed complete copy of the prohibited 
list exist within the Archives of Ontario RG-36-13 series.
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The Board also list-matched those who had their private property converted to public 
space due to convictions under the Liquor Control Act.
Reason fo r Interdiction
FIGURE 3-11. LCBO L-44 Breaches of the Liquor Control Act
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The Board tracked persons who were convicted under the Liquor Control Act 
and placed them within three sub-categories: those who sold liquor; those who permitted 
drunkenness; and a general category. The Board, keeping within their temperance 
mandate, specifically tracked persons found to be selling liquor within the province.
Such individuals would have been convicted under section 87.(1) of the Liquor Control 
Act (R.S.O. 1937. V Geo. VI. c.294) and also in most cases would have had their private 
residence converted to public property. The Board also specifically tracked anyone who 
had permitted “drunkenness to take place in any house or on any premises of which he is 
the owner, tenant or occupant” in order to identify and control populations who 
promoted intemperance (R.S.O. 1937. V Geo. VI. c.294 s. 105(a)). The remaining 
individuals tracked due to their convictions under the Liquor Control Act fell under the 
heading of “General” and posed less of a risk, though they made up 32% of all tracked 
Liquor Control Act convictions (Tabulated from Lang and McNeely.1963).
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FIGURE 3-12. LCBO L-44 Indians and Minors
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The alleged risk to the Board presented by so-called “Indians” was more than just a 
historical remnant dating from the 1700s when French Bishops preached against the sale 
of alcohol to First Nations (Riddle. 1931). Allowing "Indians" to obtain liquor was in 
violation of two pieces of legislation - the Indian Act and the Liquor Control Act - and 
would result in criminal conviction as well as public disdain. During the years that 
liquor was barred from “Indians” a number of LCBO vendors were subject to 
prosecution under this legislation (Rex v. Brown. 1930; Rex v. Webb. 1943). These racist 
laws rested on the established legal precedent that “Indians” were “particularly 
susceptible to, and likely injured by, the use of intoxicants” (Ibid). Though these laws 
would ultimately be found to have “caused inequality before the law” and were struck 
down, this racist perception of “weakness” nonetheless played a significant role in
LCBO risk assessment (Rex v. Martin. 1917; Supreme Court of Canada. 1970).^
From 1927 until First Nations acquired the legal right to drink in Canada in the 
mid 1950's, it was LCBO procedure to categorically reject all applicants that appeared to 
be of “Indian blood”(LCBO Circular 750.1929; LCBO Instructions’ to Vendors. 1927). 
If these rejected individuals pressed their application by arguing that they were not in 
fact Indians, the onus was on the applicant to produce documented evidence signed by
 ̂ Supreme Court of Canada (1970) quoted in “OPP Crime and Liquor Circular 5-70, Liquor Offences 
Involving Indians.” Ontario Provincial Police. Ontario Provincial Police Policing of Indian Reservations, 
Military Camps and Parks, Files RG 23 H-8a series. Toronto: Archives of Ontario.
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either the local Indian agent or the Deputy Attendant General of Indian Affairs to prove 
the contrary. The circulars then stated that if the applicant had such evidence or held a 
card of enfranchisement, then s/he would be dealt with like any other applicant (LCBO 
1923, 1937). However, these individuals, even with evidence of “white” (assimilated) 
status, were not granted access to liquor, as the Board explained “that any person may be 
refiised the privilege of purchasing liquor, if such person is considered by the vendor as 
being unfit to possess liquor by reason of his financial standing, the probability of his 
purchasing for resale; or his general behaviour as the result of drinking intoxicants”
(Ibid). If any doubt remained in the mind of the vendors as to how to interpret that 
statement, the circular continues; “therefore, a person of part-Indian blood, Hving in, 
say, an urban community, could be refused for such reason” (Ibid).
The LCBO rehed on one key technology to determine non-inclusion within the 
“Indian” category: the enfranchisement card. These “card certificates of 
enfranchisement” were, under the Indian Act, distributed to those “Indians” who by 
choice, marriage, education or employment were “ipso facto...enfranchised under this 
Act”(Indian Act. 1876 s. 86). The cards were “bluish in colour, with rounded comers, 
about 4" X 5" and b[ore] the coat-of-arms at the head of same and [wa]s signed by the 
Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs” and vendors were informed that the 
“only Indians who are entitled to purchase or have permits are those in possession of the 
usual blue form or letter from the Indian Agent and signed by him, stating that he is no 
longer an Indian” (LCBO Circular 1292.1931; LCBO Circular 3863.1947)
The LCBO focussed upon these cards rather than upon the Indian Affairs formal 
lists because they were granted exclusively to individuals. Although the spouse and 
children of a card holder were considered "white" under the law, cards were only issued
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to the particular individuals who had undergone the legal process of enfranchisement.
This resulted in cases where fathers who had been enfranchised could purchase liquor 
legally, while their children and subsequent generations could not. Since these children 
were already “white” they could not receive enfranchisement cards, and so were 
suspended between the legal and LCBO racial boundaries of classification.
By choosing this card as their technology of classification, the Board limited 
permit holders of “Indian blood” to those individuals who had forfeited their rights and 
“Indian” identity. Under law, an individual may not be an “Indian” yet the LCBO cited 
the “following] the Indian mode of life” provision of the “Non-treaty Indian” 
classification as a justification for maintaining “Indian looking” people on their 
interdiction / Indian hst.
Minors, those under the age of 21 who managed to purchase a permit or had been 
convicted under the Liquor Control Act, were also tracked by the LCBO. Given that a 
key element of temperance arguments was that the Hquor trade prayed on the innocent, 
minors posed a great risk to the LCBO The LCBO was adamant about maintaining an 
anti-youth appearance and it went so far as to threaten permittees with permit 
cancellation if they provided minors with empty bottles (LCBO 881.1929). Minors 
themselves posed little problem to the LCBO until after the Second World War during 
which Hquor had been legaUy provided to them overseas by the government and then 
provided illegally by their fellow officers upon their return to Canada. After the war the 
Board tracked these cases more diligently and there was a large increase in the number 
of convictions of minors by the Ontario Provincial Police for Hquor related offenses 
(Annual Reports of the Ontario Provincial Police 1945-1955). From the 1940's to the 
1950's the number of minors convicted for drinking had more than tripled and by 1959
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over 1,000 individuals per year were convicted and tracked (Ibid).
“Indians and Minors” were traditionally tracked separately by the LCBO as can 
be seen from the separate numbers of 4 and 5 allocated to each category respectively on 
the LCBO’s Analysis of prohibitory orders form L-44 (see figure 3-12 above). While 
these were separate categories they do appear together on the L-44 form. Two reasons 
come to mind to explain this conjunction: first, that "Indians" have within the Canadian 
legal tradition been treated as conceptual minors when it came to alcohol legislation; and 
secondly, because in the post-war years both Indians and Minors posed a logistically 
similar threat to intemperance as they both had legally obtained liquor in Europe during 
the WWII and were likely to be served at either the Legion Halls or by fellow officers. 
Underage drinkers, of course, had no recourse to civil rights complaints, unlike the 
“vocal Native organizations” cited by Heron (2003: 319) who often spoke but were not 
heard (i.e., First Nations servicemen received prejudicial treatment with regard to 
accessing veteran’s benefits, an issue that finally reached the national political stage in 
2005). In this regard the LCBO reminded its vendors that even though “an 
unenfranchised Indian is, or has been, a member of the Armed Forces does not alter his 
status as an Indian. He is still prohibited” (LCBO Circular 3940, 1948).
FIGURE 3-13. LCBO L-44 “Best Interests” / Board Decision
Best Interests | ;
' . _ j - i  ^  j .
IA B;C D E FÎG  Hi 2  |
Finally, the remainder of tracked individuals were listed based on data mined from the 
LCBO’s various surveillance technologies. Exclusive sorting revealed the need to
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expand the “drunk” list to include those who in all likelihood would “abuse the permit 
privilege” (LCBO 904, 1930). In 1930 the Board started to issue what it called 
“preventative cancellations”(LCBO 904, 1930.) These were “intended to prevent some 
unsuitable party obtaining a permit” and what the Board argued would be the inevitable 
“collection and forwarding of his permit” (Ibid). In the order delivered to an individual it 
was explained that: “this notice is sent as a preventative of your exercise of the permit 
privilege, because of non-confidence in your proper observance of the law” (Ibid).
Though none of these individuals had actually committed acts that would have 
them placed on the prohibited list, they were nonetheless added by the Board because, 
through its surveillance technologies, their intemperance had become a ‘predictable’ part 
of a fixture already over. This has a science fictional feel about it and is akin to the 
theory of precrime (arrest of would-be criminals) imagined by Philip K. Dick (1956) in 
Minority Report, right down to the punch cards containing the prophesies of the precogs 
divining the future. Less dramatically, however, is the fact that advanced surveillance 
has as a core goal the mastery of time. As Bill Bogard has observed (1996: 34), the 
“essential temporal orientation” of surveillance under the sign of simulation is the 
fixture-past, a future already mastered. The absolute reduction of uncertainty means that 
the temporal spectrum of past-present-future may be manipulated based on ’’the social 
context of [its] utilization,” (Castells 2000:492) in this case the risks attributed to a 
racialized Other about which non-confidence was produced a priori to evidence to the 
contrary.
The listing of these individuals can be understood as the direct result of the 
Board’s statistical analysis and sorting technolo^es. As sorting technology was 
embraced in the mid 1940's there was also a marked increase in the number of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
individuals statistically pre-eliminated on the grounds that the Board felt it was in “the 
best interests of all involved” (LCBO Interdiction Order; Annual Reports of the LCBO 
1935-1951 see figure 3-14 below).
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As one can see from the graph above, until 1944 “Board Decision” played either 
an equal or lesser role in regards to interdicting individuals. From 1944, the year that the 
Board started incorporating IBM punch cards into their permit system, to 1951, the year 
that the Board stopped publishing their interdiction numbers, the number of individuals 
eliminated based on the Board’s predictive technologies, or “best interests,” increased a 
startling 144%, resulting in over 2,000 listings annually. Ultimately 19,302 listings were 
made under the “Board Decision” classification between 1944-1951, making it by far 
the most common means for listing after 1944 (Annual Reports of the LCBO 1935-
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1951). This is not, then, a matter of small numbers.
Conclusion
The Province of Ontario was not alone in requiring drinkers to purchase a permit 
in order to acquire alcohol. There were exceptions, as Craig Heron notes in his study 
Booze (2003: 280), but even exceptional provinces had powerfiil liquor control boards 
that set limits on purchasing alcohol and where and when and by whom it could be 
consumed. The choice of Ontario is not anomalous.
Advances in sorting technology emboldened the LCBO to reconceptualize 
relations between Head Office and individual consumers. While pre-Hollerith LCBO 
surveillance required a string of subjective human assessments from the local vendor to 
the local police or liquor inspector, and then Head Office, tabulation and statistical 
analysis required only data collection, sharing and computation. One byproduct was a 
severe reduction in the possible points of entry for empathy toward the predicaments of 
alcohol consumers and, more importantly, points of resistance within the LCBO by 
individual agents themselves subject to close observation and therefore with little 
latitude to act upon local knowledge and exercise discretion. It is not unusual for 
surveillance technologies to change the character of occupational knowledge (de­
humanization toward automation) and the directionality of critical attention to the 
prospective (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 58). Mariana Valverde (2003: 203) refers to 
the hybrid and fuzzy “epistemology” (knowledge practices) of vendors and judges in 
relation to questions of Indianness as they bear upon access to alcohol. However, 
Valverde shows little interest in the technologies of social sorting which radically
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changed the character of such “epistemological” labour from intuition and a mixed bag 
of so-called “facts” to a sweeping pre-eliminative projection. It is by paying closer 
attention to the Hollerith-generated sorts that understanding will be enriched of the 
LCBO’s attempt to control “epistemology” through modeling made possible by new 
technology.
The implementation of social sorting technologies also had a serious impact on 
category membership as statistical predictors such as income, in the case of the LCBO 
interdiction classification, rendered the categories of "wealthy" and "drunkard" mutually 
exclusive, while the boundaries of previously separate categories such as "Indian" and 
"interdicted" became blurred. This can be understood as a product of the blunt 
rationality of categorization; technological sorting tools are only as sophisticated as their 
pre-programmed assumptions and limited input data. To be sure, this study remains in 
the pre-electronic era before point-of-purchase technologies came of age as networked 
databases. The permits, purchase forms and lists are near precursors to today's scanners, 
barcodes, loyalty cards and computerized customer profiling.
Moreover, the role that the justification for interdiction played in LCBO 
categorization shifted alongside new technologies. Originally, drunkenness, bootlegging 
and misspending were in themselves the only criteria for interdiction but as soon as the 
strategy of pre-elimination was adopted, the original justifications for interdiction took a 
backseat to statistical predictors justified on the ground of “best interests” by a 
paternalistic and technologically aggressive LCBO.
The geo-racial social sorting and categorization of statistically determined 
populations by the LCBO suggests a much larger relationship between Hollerith sorting
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technologies and morally bankrupt social action.
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Chapter 4
A Kind of Prohibition Part II: Targets of the LCBO’s Interdiction List
Between 1927 and 1975 the Liquor Control Board of Ontario listed over 79,000 
individuals, altering not only their ability to purchase liquor but also their property 
rights, exposure to surveillance mechanisms, and social relations within their 
communities. As argued previously, interdiction orders required detailed investigations 
that delved deep into social and private lives collecting information which the Board 
described as the “intimate details which outside of the family itself, can be only be 
known to the clergyman and the social worker”(Annual Reports of the LCBO 1927-
1928.1928). Upon the completion of an investigation, the LCBO’s permit department 
would make the ultimate decision about the fitness of the investigated individual and 
severity of the action to be taken.
In analysing the surviving LCBO interdiction files at the Archives of Ontario, 
one again finds the shadow of the temperance movement and an uneven application of 
Board powers across the province. What is shown is a system of control highly 
dependent upon gender, race, provincial region and class that actively supported not 
only the Board’s own temperance concepts of morality but also reinforced other systems 
of institutional control. It is the purpose of this chapter to discover, through statistical 
analysis of the remaining interdiction records, the predictors of board disciplinary action 
and flesh out the targets of the interdiction list.
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Data Collection
Data for this chapter was gathered from all LCBO files in the RG-36-13 series at 
the Archives of Ontario. These files contain the original letters that requested an 
investigation of someone by the LCBO as well as all the resulting orders, police reports, 
and other miscellaneous records (medical or sanitarium). The series consists of 13 
metres of text and includes lists of all individuals interdicted through judges' orders and 
a representative sample of LCBO files of prohibition, interdiction and those under
surveillance. ̂  In all, the series contains the complete files of almost 500 individuals 
listed by the LCBO who were investigated between 1946 and 1976. The series is named, 
however, after the Liquor Licensing Board because interdiction records were transferred 
to the LLBO in 1976 following an alteration to the interdiction procedures within the 
Liquor Control Act.
Investigations were initiated by the Board if it felt that an individual was abusing 
a permit privilege or if the Board was contacted and requested to investigate someone in 
particular. When an investigation began a file was opened on the person in question. 
Within these files were at the very least a letter from the individual that applied to the 
Board to initiate an investigation, the investigation report and a resulting letter from the 
Board to the individual under investigation regarding its conclusions. Most fiiles were 
also supplemented by letters from policing organizations concerning the individual’s 
criminal histoiy though some held letters from a wide variety of sources including non­
governmental aid organizations, Alcoholics Anonymous, church officials, doctors and.
1 “All inactive files were discarded in the mid-fifties” and only a representative sample was kept after the 
interdiction records were transferred to the Archives of Ontario by the LLBO (Lang and McNeely. 1962;8; 
Archives of Ontario Search Aid.2003).
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in more recent files, lawyers.
For this research files were reviewed, ordered by date, and then allocated a 
representative number as to respect the privacy of those who were the targets of LCBO 
investigations. No information is included within this text which would enable anyone 
that was listed to be identified as was stipulated in the research agreement with the 
Archives of Ontario. In order to analyse these LCBO files, data was collected fi’om them 
on the age, sex, geographical location, involvement of external agencies as well as data 
regarding the applicant initiating the LCBO investigations, their relationship to the 
person under investigation and the reason provided by the applicant to justify the 
investigation. In a few cases multiple reasons were provided by the applicant; in these 
cases the researcher selected the predominant reason. In the very few cases where 
multiple reasons were provided and no further explanation was presented by the 
applicant, then the researcher selected the first listed reason within the applicant’s letter.
Linear Regression
The data was analysed to discover which factors played a significant role in 
determining the severity of Board Action. The LCBO could respond to requests for 
interdiction in one of five ways: take no action, issue a warning letter, issue a partial 
board order limiting either home or public consumption, file an order of interdiction (or 
"full board order”) for a period of one year, or finally file an order of interdiction for an 
indefinite period. Each possibility denotes a uniform increase in the severity of Board 
action and thus allows for an analysis by means of an linear regression.
A linear regression presupposes that a multitude of factors play partial roles in
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determining the ultimate outcome, in this case the severity of Board action. The model is 
often simplified into the following equation;
Yj == Bq + B iX ji + B2X21 + ... BpXpi + Ej 
Within this equation Y represents the outcome variable (the severity of Board Action) 
and is explicable through the predictor variables. For this analysis, the dependant 
variables were collected from the interdiction files and included gender, race, who 
applied to initiate the investigation, the reason provided by the applicant, persons 
interviewed during the investigation, job training of the individual under investigation 
and, finally, which region of the province the individual lived in. These collected factors 
were then recoded into the predictor variables (appearing as Xj, X2 , ...Xp ) and through
the analysis were given fitted values or parameter estimates (appearing as Bq, B%, B2 ,
. . .Bp) that denote the impact of the given variable; E is the error or model deviation; and
i = 1, 2, ...n for n observations.
The results of the analysis yielded a B score, or parameter estimates, for each 
tested predictor variable. This score, in significant cases, denotes to what extent the 
particular factor impacts the severity of Board action on the five point scale of possible
Board action. The analysis also yields a score, or the percentage of the final result 
that can be explained by the measured factors. In this case the analysis provided a
substantial score of 0.585, meaning that the final model can explain almost 60% of 
the severity of the Board’s response. Significant relationships were found in almost all 
of the measured factors and the complete results are as follows.
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Race
Within the remaining interdiction files few cases specifically denoted race. 
Investigators commented on race in approximately 6% of the interdiction files, singling 
out both “Indians” and “Negroes.” The racial classification of “Indian” proved 
significant, increasing the severity of Board action by a score of 0.306. As argued 
previously, the drinking of “Indians” was perceived as a serious threat by the Board and 
significant resources were committed to keep individuals with this social/legal 
classification firom purchasing alcohol. “Indians” could not purchase alcohol legally 
until 1954 within Ontario and once able to do so were interdicted to a disproportionate 
degree. Although the impact of the “Indian” classification has been touched on briefly in 
previous chapters, it is reviewed in detail in chapter 5.
Gender
Gender played a significant role in the first level of the regression model, albeit 
specific relationships determined by gender no doubt drew significance away fi'om this 
variable. Gender discrimination ultimately impacted the severity of Board action by 
0.178, making women more likely than their male counterparts to be listed by the Board.
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Figure 4-1. Targets of Interdiction by Gender and Relationship
Female Male
Applicant Predominance % Applicant Predominance %
Police 34.2% Wife 25.58 %
Judge 16.2 % Police 23.00 %
Self 14.7 % Mother 14.40 %
LCBO, Board 13.2 % Judge 12.91 %
Husband 8.8 % Self 7.34 %
Daughter 4.4 % LCBO, Board 6.32 %
Father 2.9 % Father 4.56 %
LCBO, Investigator 2.9 % Brother 1.77 %
Son 1.5 % Daughter 1.51 %
Brother 1.5 % Sister 1.51 %
Mother 1.5 % Son 1.51 %
Aid Organizations 1.26 %
Court Administrator 1.26 %
Doctor 0.51 %
In Law 0.51 %
First Nations’ Band 0.51 %
MB- Totals may be above 100% due to multiple applicants for a single application.
Far more men were the targets of Board investigations and interdiction than 
women, accounting for over 80% of all remaining interdiction files. The targeting of 
men by the interdiction list can be understood not only through the fact that they 
constituted a larger percentage of the drinking population but also because of the gender 
dimension of the temperance movement and its morality concerning the financial impact 
of male drinking on the home (Heron.2003:232-233).
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Figure 4-2. Cartoon Depicting Temperance Morality and Male Drinking (Ibid)
EN V E LO PE
'BREAKER
Which Will You Vote To Give It To?
Investigations into the actions of men by the LCBO more often resulted in milder 
penalties of warning letters and limited consumption than those concerning women. 
While the bulk of investigations into both genders ended in the subject's being listing, 
the percentage of successful listings of women was still higher than that of men by 
9.6%.
Figure 4-3. Result of All Investigations, Sorted by Gender of Person
LCBO Response Women Men
No Action 1.5% 10.2 %
Disciplinary Action 98.5 % 89.8 %
Warning Letter 7.4 % 9.4 %
Limited Consumption 1.5 % 2.3 %
Listed 89.7 % 78.1 %
The role that gender played in interdiction is also strongly expressed by the 
“applicant” factor of this analysis. The impact of the interdiction list on women is 
reviewed in chapter 6.
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Applicants
Outcomes were strongly influenced by the source of applicants. The prevailing 
logic was that applications would be submitted by close family members and the 
judiciary, though in reality anyone could contact the Board and request an investigation. 
Applications came from two main sources: Institutions - such as branches of the 
Criminal Justice System including the police or judges, hospitals or mental institutions, 
or from individuals. Lang and McNeely (1962), authors who had gained access to the 
complete list before it was mostly destroyed, found that 18% of the applications came 
from institutions while 31 % came from individual sources.





















15%Liquor Control Act 
28%
NB - Tabulated from results published in Lang and McNeely (1962) The Use o f Interdiction in Ontario. 
Addiction Research Foimdation. Toronto.
Lang and McNeely found that the majority of LCBO listings were the result of
automatic Board action due to convictions involving alcohol. This was the norm until
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the 1940's when the Board started to “use greater discretion” regarding listing 
individuals (Lang and McNeely. 1963:5). From the annual reports of the LCBO one can 
see that convictions played the dominant role in interdiction until 1943 when “Board 
decision,” or decisions made by the LCBO based on their own investigations, took over 
the lead role of how individuals were interdicted in Ontario (Annual Reports of the 
LCBO. 1934-1953). These automatic listings were generally absent from the remaining 
interdiction files, perhaps due to the changes in Board policy at that time, forcing 
investigations of these individuals.
Institutional Applications
Institutional applications enjoyed a higher percentage of success at having 
individuals listed than individual requests by a margin of 26.74 %. Applications came 
from a wide variety of sources including police, judges. Aid Organizations, 
municipalities and from Bands. The figure below shows all institutional sources and the 
percentage that each represented within the remaining Interdiction files of the LCBO 
within the Archives of Ontario’s RG-36 series.
Figure. 4-5. Institutional Applications for Interdiction
Institution Predominance % Institution Predominance %
Police 24.9 % LCBO Vendors 0.6 %
Judges / Criminal Court 13.8 % Municipal Government 0.6 %
LCBO Internal Analysis 6.9 % First Nations Bands 0.4 %
Aid Organizations 0.8 % Alcoholics Anonymous 0.2 %
Within the institutional group judicial action stands out as the most influential of 
Board action. An application made by a Judge increased the Board response score
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66
greater than any other measured variable, impacting the final score by 1.491 on the five 
point scale of possible outcomes. Under the Act Judges’ orders entailed an indefinite 
interdiction for the ordered individual. But since the LCBO was literally above the law, 
in a few cases it overturned such orders, though this only accounted for a handful of 
individual cases fi’om 1927-1975 (Liquor Control Act S.0.1927. c.70 s.25.2; Annual 
Reports of the LCBO 1927-1975).
The roles played by other institutions were not found to be significant when 
other factors were taken into account. The role of the police for example did not play a 
significant role at the level of the application but did so at the level of the Board’s 
interviews during an investigation.
Individual Applications
In the case of individual applications, the disciplinary power of the LCBO was 
mostly activated by women. Over 80% of requests came fi’om women, the bulk of whom 
were wives (48%) who sought to have their husbands added to the LCBO’s “drunk list.” 
Mothers were the second largest classification making up 25% of the total requests by 
individuals followed finally by the highest male category of fathers at 10%. The graph 
below shows the breakdown of individual requests by gender and by classification.
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Figure 4-6. Breakdown of Individual Applications for Investigations
Applicant Predominance % Applicant Predominance %
Wife 41.36 % Daughter 3.16%
Mother 20.48 % Son 3.21 %
Self, Male 14.05 % Husband 2.40 %
Father 8.03 % Sister 2.40 %
Self, Female 4.01 % Landlord, Male 0.40 %
The linear regression analysis yielded significant results for applications made by 
sons, wives, mothers, daughters and husbands. All significant individual applicant 
categories impacted the severity of Board action negatively - that is they reduced the 
severity of Board action. The relationship with the largest impact was sons (-1.223), 
while wives (-0.697), mothers (-0.568) and husbands (-0.445) all moved the score in the 
negative direction. This is understandable considering the fact that institutions were 
granted greater status by the Board and also because of the Board’s general suspicion 
towards individuals. The difference in B scores, or the impact on the final Board action, 
depicts the social status of various relationships within the family. Husbands scored the 
lowest negative score, making their applications more likely to result in interdiction than 
any other individual category. Interestingly mothers came second, followed by 
daughters, wives and then finally sons; thus lending institutional power to the role of the 
dominant male figure in the household as well as supporting the enduring influence of 
mothers over children.
Individuals that applied to have themselves interdicted were dealt with 
differently by the Board. For these cases the regression analysis demonstrated a 
significant relationship with a positive B score of .391. When an individual applied to
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have themselves listed the Board automatically issued a one year interdiction order as 
long as the investigator was satisfied that the letter had in fact been sent by the person 
listed in the application. They accounted for almost 10% of all cases while a significant 
portion of these letters were typed on police letterhead and signed as witnessed by 
constables. Due to the close relationships between the LCBO and GPP it is very likely 
that police officers used their knowledge of LCBO procedures especially “self 
application” to quickly list individuals they felt were in need of “extra attention” while 
not being required to undergo a complete formal investigation (LCBO Circular
557.1928).
Reason For Application
A vast number of reasons were provided by applicants as to why an individual 
should be investigated, though few offered significant relationships when statistically 
analysed. This was perhaps due to the role that police and financial interviews (to be 
reviewed later in this chapter) had on the final score, drawing significance away from 
the reasons provided in the applications. Under the Liquor Control Act interdiction was 
used in very specific cases where an individual “by excessive drinking of liquor, 
misspends, wastes, or lessens his estate, or injures his health, or interrupts the peace and 
happiness of his family,” but the Board also reserved the right to have an individual 
listed “for any cause which it deems sufficient with or without any hearing” (Liquor 
Control Act. S O 1927 c.70 s.95(l); s.43(l)).
Interestingly the wording of the reasons why an individual should be investigated 
by the Board were fairly constant within the applications. The reasons provided and their
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predominance within the remaining interdiction files were as follows. 
Figure 4-7. Reasons Cited Within Interdiction Applications.
Reason Provided Predominance % Reason Provided Predominance %
No Reason Provided 27.15% Neglecting Children 2.58%
Overindulgence 21.98 % Health, Physical 2.58 %
Violence 13.58% Crime 1.93 %
Misspending 9.05 % Advised by an Official 1.72%
Health, Mental 5.60 % Family Problems 1.07 %
Control 3.88 % Minor (Under 21) 0.65 %
The linear regression found one reason to be significant: health. Healt 1 positively
impacted the Board action making the individual more likely to be interdicted. Health 
had a B score of .387 and was cited in 8.18 % of all cases. These cases included both 
physical health problems and the mental problems created by drinking, including 
everything fi'om an addictive sickness model as professed by Alcoholics Anonymous to 
more conventional physical deterioration such as liver disease. Most cases that cited 
health provided evidence of fairly extreme health problems due to liquor consumption 
and often would be supplemented by a doctor’s report or interview.
Interviews
Interviews were conducted by LCBO investigators to determine an individual’s 
fitness to drink. According to early Board instructions investigations consisted of “such 
particulars as it is possible to obtain as to the character and standing of the 
permittee”(Annual Reports of the LCBO 1927-1928.1928:13). Interdiction records 
reveal that the LCBO’s directions were interpreted quite liberally in this regard and data
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was collected on a wide variety of subjects from multiple sources and resulted in very 
detailed personal records.
In most cases the LCBO relied upon the police for their main source of data
collection but the complete list of interview sources and their predominance reveals the
extent and scope of the LCBO’s investigative arm (see figure below).
Figure 4-8. Interview Subjects and Their Predominance Within the LCBO’s 
Interdiction
Records.
Interview Subject Predominance % Interview Subject Predominance %
Applicant 100.00 % LCBO Vendor 6.03 %
Police 56.25 % Finances, Employer 5.38 %
Court Records 37.28 % Neighbour 1.29 %
Finances, Banking 23.06 % Alcoholics Anonymous 1.07 %
Medical 12.28 % License Holders 0.43 %
Social Services (Welfare, 
Child Services)
7.11% Educator 0.21 %
LCBO Investigator 689% Church Officials 0.21 %
MB- Only those who voiced either a positive or negative recommendation in regards to having the 
individual under investigation are represented in the table above.
In nearly all interviews contained within the investigator’s reports personal 
information was passed on to the LCBO as well as the interview subject’s 
recommendation for Board action. This allowed for an analysis that accounted not only 
for the presence of a particular interview source but also the impact of either favourable 
or unfavourable reports from the interview subjects. The linear regression shows that 
significant relationships existed for the Police, LCBO vendors, LCBO investigators and 
also Finances, a composite of both employer interviews and banking information.
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Police
Interviews with police contained information primarily relating to previous 
criminal acts or investigations. Often the Board would receive an individual’s full 
criminal history to add to their own interdiction files. Police interviews appeared in 
56.25 % of the interdiction files and ultimately impacted the Board’s action score 
positively by .684. Policing liquor use and abuse was a major focus of the Ontario 
Provincial Police and they shared a very close relationship with the LCBO. From its 
inception, the LCBO thanked the OPP regularly: “thanks and appreciation of the Board 
are hereby tendered to the Provincial and Municipal Police Officers throughout the 
province for thdr hearty co-operation”(Aimual Report of the Liquor Control 
Board. 1928-1929.1929). The OPP also thanked the LCBO in its annual reports. Not only 
did these two institutions share their investigation information, the OPP conducted 
interdiction investigations in remote areas of the province and used the regulatory 
powers of the Board to conduct warrantless investigations - under the Liquor Control 
Act the LCBO was not bound by law and could write their own regulations concerning 
liquor raids and investigations (Liquor Control Act. S O. 1927. c.70 s. 108). An LCBO 
circular directed to the OPP, dated 1929, states:
there is being forwarded to you under special cover a number of pocket 
cases containing document of Authority signed by the Minister to search 
under the provisions contained in section 108 of the Liquor Control Act 
which is to be given to officers recommended by you in your district.
This authority is only to be used in cases of necessity and at times when a 
general search warrant signed by a police Magistrate cannot be secured
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owing to inconvenience on the part of the officer (OPP Nov.6th 1929).
Police searches under the liquor laws soared in this time period, accounting for 8 times 
the number of warrants obtained through the regulations of the criminal code in 1930.










1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949
LCA Seeu-ch Warrants -O - GO Search Warrants
NB - Tabulated from the Annual Reports of the Ontario Provincial Police 1930-1950
The Liquor Control Act also allowed for the conversion of private spaces into 
public spaces (S.O. 1927 c.70 s. 105(a)). The Board had the power to decide if a 
particular residence or business should be converted. In converted premises liquor could 
not be possessed or consumed and other rights, such as the need for a warrant to 
conduct a legal search, were lost. The implications of this regulation were potentially 
devastating to communities as the conversion of property was linked to both individual 
and building, with lingering effects.
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Finances
Interviews related to finances included records fi’om both employers and 
bankers. In most cases LCBO inspectors gathered their information from employment 
data and extrapolated how much income could be directed to liquor purchases without 
negatively affecting the home. Reports on finances often included job position, 
employer, house ownership and spending on essentials such as groceries and children’s 
clothing. A representative negative report involving an employer interview stated:
M r. is employed at Chrysler Canada Ltd. On [date] he arrived at work in an
intoxicated condition. For this, he received a three day suspension from work and was 
advised by the company to attend Alcoholics Anonymous. On [date] he took a five-week 
leave of absence from work due to illness. During that time he became intoxicated almost 
every day. He spent $30.00 a day on liquor for himself and fiiends, and the family is 
beginning to suffer financially (#147).
Over 28 percent of the remaining interdiction files contained financial information that 
was more extensive than simply job descriptions and negative financial information 
positively impacted the Board Action score by .205.
LCBO Vender
LCBO investigators rarely contacted LCBO vendors for an interview, perhaps 
due to the fact that purchase records were available through an inspection of an 
individual’s permit book or through an analysis of the original purchase records (see 
chapters 2 and 3). When vendors were interviewed their input was significant. Vendors
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commented on purchase information, if they had applied any restrictions on the permit 
or had rejected any purchases due to intoxication or unacceptable in-store behaviour. 
Vendor interviews were present in 6.03 % of the interdiction files and impacted the 
Board action score positively by .663.
LCBO Investigator
LCBO investigators themselves did not decide if an individual would be listed. 
Reports fi'om their investigations were directed to the LCBO Permit Department at Head 
Office in Toronto where the final decision was made. Though it is arguable that all of 
the collected interviews were impacted by how they appeared in the reports, 
investigators’ opinions were only exclusively present in 6.89 % of cases. When the 
investigators themselves expressed their opinions this had the second largest positive 
impact on Board scores, influencing the final result by 0.883.
Job Training/Job Position
The job training / job position held by the individual under investigation was also 
reviewed yet no particular job offered significant results. However, the types of jobs that 
were not represented within the interdiction files should be noted (see figure 4-10 
below).
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Figure 4-10. Job Training / Job Positions of Individuals Under Investigation by 
the LCBO
Job Title Predominance % Job Title Predominance %
Labourer 22.28 % Street Cleaner 1.68%
Construction / 
Carpenter
24.15% Tailor 1.68 %
Farm Worker 8.9 % Stock Clerk 1.68 %
Factory Worker 8.61 % Rail Worker 1.49 %
Guide / Trapper 5.99 % Salesman 1.49 %
Driver 4.86 % Mechanic 1.12%
Mill Worker 2.80 % House Wife 0.74 %
Unemployed 2.80 % Waitress 0.37 %
From this data one can see very strongly defined class lines with a vast 
overrepresentation of the working class and unemployed. By the late 1800's drinking 
had been established in Canada as the centre of working class social life outside the 
home and “the right to drink with other men became a major component [of] class 
identity” (Heron.2003;l 1). From the inception of the LCBO, liquor control had a 
specific class target.
It was understood, within temperance circles, that the “poor man” had little to no 
disposable income and thus his purchases of liquor must come at the expense of his 
family. With this in mind intemperance was perceived as a problem of the working class 
and the Board sought to control liquor consumption by this population. LCBO stores 
specifically decided not to remain open after 5 pm as to remove temptation for the
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working man. As The Globe reported on the LCBO’s opening day, “those most 
disappointed in Hamilton tonight were the many working men who came hot from their 
benches ‘to get some good beer.’ As said many of them were turned away” (The Globe. 
They Line Up Quickly to get Their Liquor Once Stores are Open. June 2^^ 1927). The 
LCBO explained sale restrictions by stating that “the greater majority of these cases are 
poor people, whose families can ill afford the loss” (Annual Reports of the LCBO. 1927- 
1928.1928:13). The LCBO engaged in social control by ensuring that the closing time of 
its outlets corresponded with the end of the working day, leaving little or no latitude for 
access by workers.
As the Canadian liquor historian Creg Heron (2003:232) observes, “workers 
resented the imputation that there was no difference between the drunkard and the man 
who wanted to refresh himself at the end of the working day with a glass of beer.” The 
classist element of the temperance movement was not lost on the working class.
Working people experienced a “direct attempt to take away the pleasures of the worker 
more than that of the leisured and privileged class” (Ibid.230). Street protests and riots 
ensured that the LCBO extended its hours within the first weeks of opening and 
establishments licenced to sell liquor by the glass returned to the province by 1934 (The
Globe. Store Hours Stretched. June 6^  ̂1927). The LCBO nonetheless continued to 
target the working class. As one LCBO circular explained “At no time was it the 
intention that the general public should be limited in their purchasing from our stores...if 
people are law-abiding and financially able, I see no reason why they should not be 
granted the privilege of buying what they wish” (LCBO circular 3833.1947).
Temperance morality also tied alcohol consumption to commercial 
production, and as a result, the health of the economy. In a radio address directed
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at drinkers on December 16th, 1942 the Prime Minister of Canada underlined 
that:
There can be little doubt that absence from work, and inefficient 
work, are frequently due to intemperance. At a time when every 
moment counts, absenteeism among workers in essential war 
industries may occasion heavy loss. In this highly mechanized age, 
the absence of a single key man may slow up industrial processes 
for a large number of workers (Mackenzie King. 1942)
Some within the labour movement saw liquor legislation as solely a means of bringing 
“greater profits to the manufacturer, the financier and the capitalist generally” and that 
“legislation as to what one eats or drinks is the earmark of a servile state and therefore in 
antagonism to working class interests” (Benson. 1974:274).
Region
The linear regression showed that the region in which the person under 
investigation lived played a significant role in predicting the severity of Board action. 
Although the LCBO used eight regions (Toronto, Eastern, Hamilton, Niagara Falls, 
Northern Ontario, Western Ontario No. 1, Western Ontario No.2 and Windsor) to 
breakdown the province, no accurate maps of these regions exist within the interdiction 
files. For this research the province was divided by first letter of the postal code of the 
individual under investigation (see Figure 4-13 below).
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Figure 4-13. Map of Ontario’s Postal Regions
L >U^TORONTO M
The LCBO itself commented on several occasions as to how important and effective the 
interdiction list was in rural and northern regions of the province, and an analysis of the 
distribution of interdicted individuals across these regions strongly supports this 
statement (Annual Report of the LCBO 1958-1959.1959; Annual Report of the 
LCB01972-1973.1973).
Figure 4-14. Regional Distribution of Investigated Individuals
K
28%
The linear regression discovered significant relationships for both region M 
Toronto, and Region P - Northern Ontario.
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Region P
Region P, or the northern region of Ontario, saw the highest rates of interdiction 
and was disproportionally represented within the interdiction list. While region P made 
up 31% of those investigated the linear regression found a significant relationship with a 
B score 1.18 higher than that of region M. The north was seen by LCBO Head Office as 
containing “clientele of the lowest type - Indians and Bushmen” who were in need of
strict control (LLBO minutes, January 9^  ̂1958). Historically, the north had voted in 
favour of legalizing liquor sales and on opening day of the LCBO, made national news 
for the sheer amount of liquor purchased in one day. The Globe reported that on the 
Board’s opening day stores in the northern towns of Fort William and Port Arthur sold 
liquor to more than 2,500 people - enough to “quench a $15,000 thirst” (The Globe.
They Line Up Quickly to get Their Liquor Once Stores are Open. June 2®  ̂1927). This 
would not have sat well with the LCBO’s policy of strictly controlling liquor sales.
For this reason the expansion of LCBO stores into northern communities was 
slow and “confined to points where they may be found necessary to check petty 
bootlegging and better social conditions” (Annual Report of the LCBO. 1928- 
1929.1929:14) What the reduced number of northern outlets did, in combination with 
the remoteness of northern communities, was create a social situation in which 
individuals in remote areas who wanted to drink would need to travel long distances to 
obtain liquor. The influx of drinkers into the north’s small communities proved 
unwelcome. It also proved to be a flashpoint for racism as those in search of alcohol 
were defined as “Indians” by locals, even though this racial classification was not firmly 
connected to actual lineage. In region P especially, these populations were thought to
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tarnish the record of the LCBO as they publicly displayed the negative aspects of the 
liquor trade. The interdiction list was used to control these populations, and was cited as 
a successful way of “at least removing these people from the city streets” (Kenora Minor 
News. Welfare Minister to Visit Region. July 7^  ̂1974). In this way interdiction served 
as a blunt instrument of social control, as one officer put it: “it is highly improbable that 
putting this man on the prohibited list will do him any good but it will give Mrs._ some 
protection by being able to call police when this man appears” (#119).
Region M
The linear regression showed that those within region M or the Toronto area 
were less likely to face interdiction than those of other regions, impacting the final 
outcome score by -0.318. Statistically region M accounted for 10 % of the remaining 
interdiction files and 21% of the Lang and McNeely 1962 sample. The reduced chances 
of the individuals of region M of being listed by the LCBO can be explained by the facts 
that Toronto held less strongly to tempérant values and that listing was a less effective 
tool against illegal drinking due to the anonymity of city life.
Individuals from region M rarely sought to activate the disciplinary powers of 
the Board by applying for interdiction investigations. The comparatively diminished role 
that letters from individuals played within Region M is interesting as it gives strength to 
the argument that Board action was ultimately more strongly tied to public opinion and 
not the control of “drunken” behaviour. Toronto also had voted “wet” fairly 
substantially in the plebiscite of 1924 showing that liquor consumption was less of a 
moral issue as opposed to other regions, such as region K (Ottawa) and region L (south­
western Ontario).
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Conclusion
From the linear regression and subsequent analysis one can safely conclude that 
the LCBO’s interdiction list was directed at certain populations and the Board’s 
disciplinary power was more easily activated by particular institutions and individuals. 
Again we can see how the Board’s devotion to temperance morality and ideals shifted 
their disciplinary power against women, the First Nations, the working class and those 
within the northern region of the province.
After the interdiction list was relocated to the Liquor Licencing Board of Ontario 
in 1975, the process of interdiction became more formalized and the number of listed 
individuals dropped considerably. Henceforth, the interdiction list played a much 
smaller role in controlling liquor consumption in Ontario over the years though the 
remaining interdiction records at the Archives of Ontario contain active files from as late 
as the 1980's and early 1990's. Although this type of control system is no longer used in 
the case of alcohol it has found new life within the province’s casinos, allowing 
individuals to again be “interdicted” from the vice of gambling.
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le 1. Multiple Regression Modeling Results for LCBO Interdiction
N = 464 Models
I  II  III IV
Predictors B SE B SE P B SE P B SE P B SE P








raceFIRSTNATIONS 0.29 0.17 0.09 0.02 0.14. 0.84. 0.03 0.14 0.83 0.24 0.12 0.4* 0.30 0.12 0.01*
GenderFEMALE 0.30 0.14 0.03* 0.07 0.12 0.54 0.09 0.12 0.43 0.13 0.10 0.20 0.18 0.10 0.74
Who Reported
JUDGE 0.99 0.13 0.0*** 1.00 0.13 0.0*** 1.46 0.11 0.0*** 1.49 0.11 0.0***
MOTHER -0.70 0.14 0.0*** -0.69 0.14 0.0*** -0.54 0.11 0.0*** -0.56 0.11 0.0***
SELF 0.06 0.14 0.658 0.07 0.14 0.629 0.41 0.12 0.0** 0.391 0.12 0.0**
WIFE -0.98 o n 0.0*** -0.76 0.09 0.0*** -1.00 0.11 0.0*** -0.69 0.10 0.0***
DAUGHTER -1.04 0.30 0.01* -1.08 0.30 0.0*** -0.67 0.25 0.0** -0.64 0.25 0.011*
SON -1.24 0.32 0.0*** -1.35 0.32 0.0*** -1.18 0.26 0.0*** -1.22 0.26 0.0***
HUSBAND -0.92 0.38 O.OI* -0.92 0.38 0.01* -0.48 0.31 0.127 -.445 0.31 0.157
Why
HEALTH 0.49 0.20 0.01* 0.36 0.17 0.03* 0.38 0.17 0.02*
Interviews
POLICE 0.69 0.05 0.0*** 0.68 0.05 0.0***
FINANCES 0.22 0.07 0.0** 0.20 0.07 0.0**
LCBO VENDOR 0.57 0.15 0.0*** 0.66 0.15 0.0***
LCBO INVESTIGATOR 0.86 0.13 0.0*** 0.88 0.13 0.0***
Region
M -  TORONTO -0.31 0.12 0.0**
P -  Northern Ontario -0.20 0.08 0.01*
%Variance Explained (R^) 1.2 34.9 35.7 57.6 58.5
Percent Increase from 






























From Indigenous to Indigent: First Nations Legal Classifications and the ‘ Drunken 
Indian” Prototype
We were the first settlers on this continent. Then, the whites came and made us Indians.
- Indian Councillor, Sarnia Indian Reserve, Sept. 2^^ 1953
The only Indians who are entitled to purchase or have permits are those in possession o f 
the usual blue form or letter from the Indian Agent and signed by him, stating that he is 
no longer an Indian. - LCBO circ. 3863, August 9̂ * 1947
Canada’s First Peoples have a broad range of responses to alcohol - from 
complete abstinence, to controlled use under many conditions and problem drinking. But 
the belief that “Indians” are prone to alcohol abuse persists within Canadian culture, 
even though explanations of alcoholism based on the concepts of race and ethnicity have 
been widely disproved and rejected (Trimble and Beauvais. 2001:3). In this chapter the 
focus will be on the classification of “Indian,” itself nothing more than a legal 
construction, and the “drunken Indian” stereotype as primarily an effect of Canadian 
bureaucratic (administrative, legal) classification and provincial liquor law enforcement.
Classifications play an active role in constituting society. In their collaborative 
work on medical classifications. Star, Bowker and Neumann (1997) touch on the 
concept of “convergence” to explain this phenomenon. Star et al. define convergence as 
“the double process by which information artifacts and social worlds are fitted to each 
other and come together” or in other words, as the effect “of changing the world so that 
the system’s depiction of reality becomes true” (Ibid; Bowker and Star.2000;49). The 
authors fixrther explain that “a given information artifact” such as “a classification
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system, a database, an interface, and so forth” can be understood as “constitutive of [the] 
social world,” in that it acts as a shared informational hub upon which classifications can 
adhere themselves to reality and therefore impact real situations (Star et al. in press).
Key to understanding convergence is the concept of “tightness”: the closer the hub is 
tied to reality the more “tightness” the classification has, or the tighter the restrictive 
elements regarding the defining characteristics of the classification are to the social 
element identified and depicted by the classification. While convergence is the necessary 
result of classification, tightness depicts the extent to which that classification will 
dictate social action.
Although the work of Star et al remains for the most part limited to medical 
classifications, Canadian liquor legal history provides an excellent opportunity to 
investigate concrete examples of convergence and develop theory about the factors that 
influence the tightness of legal classifications. In this historical case study the Canadian 
“Indian” legal classification is investigated and it is shown how current racial 
stereotypes regarding alcohol and the First Nations in Ontario can be traced back to 
classification policy and the LCBO’s zeal to control both liquor sales and public 
opinion.
Canadian Legal Classifications and the First Nations
Central to Canadian “Indian” policy is, and always has been, classification - who 
is considered an “Indian” and who is not. In Canada race definition was a legal necessity
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for two main reasons; first, the peoples of the First Nations were not granted the rights 
and fi-eedoms of British citizens under the law and second, laws surrounding treaties, 
reserves and land use required legal means for differentiating the First Nations peoples 
from the colonizing Europeans. A new legal category of “Indian” was created to meet 
this need. It is important to remember that Canadian racial history is dissimilar to that of 
the United States. The infamous “drop of blood” method of classification of Afiican 
American racial status in the United States was much too broad to apply to the Canadian 
First Nations due to governmental treaty obligations. Consequently a much narrower 
classification method was developed.
The term “Indian” was first applied as a legal classification in 1850 mAn Act fo r  
the Better Protection o f the Lands and Property o f the Indians in Lower Canada (S.C. 
1850, c. 42, 13&14 Vic., s. 5.). It was explained that “the following classes of persons 
are and shall be considered as Indians”:
First. - All persons of Indian blood, reputed to belong to the particular Body or 
Tribe of Indians interested in such lands, and their descendants. Secondly. - All 
persons intermarried with any such Indians and residing amongst them, and the 
descendants of all such persons. Thirdly. - All persons residing among such 
Indians, whose parents on either side were or are Indians of such Body of Tribe, 
or entitled to be considered as such: And Fourthly. - All persons adopted in 
infancy by any such Indians, and residing in the Village or upon the lands of 
such Tribe or Body of Indians, and their descendants (Ibid).
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Under Canadian law “Indian” legal classification relied upon patrichraliniary and 
patriarchical concepts of race, as it still does today, but also incorporated specific social 
elements such as adoption and later what was described as “the Indian mode of 
life”(Indian Act. 1876). From 1850 forward, the classification of “Indian” changed along 
with acts of parliament. “Indians” occupied a separate and mutually exclusive 
classification from others within Canadian society - a fact perhaps best illustrated in the 
Indian Act of 1876, where it reads that the legal classification of a “person” is “an 
individual other than an Indian” (s. 10). Ultimately the Indian Act of 1876 would divide 
individuals into three separate categories; “Indians,” “non-treaty Indians” and “People,” 
all with varying levels of rights under the law. One key difference between the “Indian” 
classifications and others in Canada has been legal access and possession of alcohol. 
Though Canada did briefly pass though a period of prohibition, “Indian” and “non-treaty 
Indian” legal classifications have been, for the most part, different than the liquor 
histories for non-“Indian” classifications.
First Nations Liquor History and Canadian Law
The first “Canadian” law that prohibited the sale, trade, giving or bartering of 
alcohol to “Indians” specifically identified the Moravian Indians, in An Act to Prevent 
the Sale o f Spirituous Liquors and Strong Waters in the Tract Occupied by the Moravian 
Indians on the River Thames, in the Western District of 1801 (Geo.III c.l4). At the time 
the Moravian Nation was heavy inundated with missionaries who perceived alcohol as
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their chief adversary, and it was through their actions that liquor was criminalized 
(Smart. 1996:5). Many missionary writers told very graphic tales of “Indian” liquor 
abuse during this period; similar arguments targeted the acts of fur traders and settlers, 
bringing into question the actual extent of real “alcohol abuse” engaged in by the First 
Nations peoples of this time (MacAndrew and Edgerton. 1969:109).
The second law passed in the provinces of Canada was An Act to Prevent the 
Sale o f Spirituous Liquor to Indians. It was written in 1835 in response to the petitions 
of “the Indians residing at the Grand River, Credit, Muncey and other places in this 
Province” so that “the prayer of their petitions should be granted” regarding “the sale of̂  
barter, exchange or gift, of any distilled Spirituous Liquors by any person or persons 
whatsoever to any Indian man, woman or child” (1835.5 William c.9). The law focussed 
on the act of trading liquor with the First Nations peoples of Upper Canada itself, and 
sought to protect them from unscrupulous traders by imposing harsh punishment on 
those engaged in such trade. Nowhere does it appear, interestingly enough, that liquor is 
illegal for Native peoples to possess and/or use. Also the Act was to be temporary, only 
lasting five years, so that if needed it could be changed or amended. In 1840 an act was 
passed to amend and make permanent the 1835 law. Entitled, An Act to prevent the Sale 
o f Intoxicating Liquors to Indians (3 Victoria c. 13) it merely altered the wording of the 
1835 act.
Ten years later in 1850, the Act fo r the Protection o f Indians in Upper Canada 
from Imposition, and the Property Occupied by or Enjoyed by Them from Trespass or 
Injury o f Which was passed, specifying that “it shall not be lawful for any person to sell.
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barter, exchange or give to any Indian, man, woman or child within this province, any 
kind of spirituous liquors in any maimer or way, or to cause or procure the same to be 
done for any purpose whatsoever.” Although a strikingly similar act was passed for 
Lower Canada in the very same year called An Act fo r the better protection o f the lands 
and Property o f the Indians in Lower Canada no prohibition of alcohol was put in place 
for the First Nations Peoples of Lower Canada. This difference in law is important in so 
far as it supports the premise that the legal prohibition of alcohol was, during this period, 
for the protection of the First Nations from unscrupulous traders since by this time, the 
First Nations of Lower Canada relied more on farming than on trade when compared 
with their counterparts in Upper Canada (Smart. 1996; 1-14; Heron.2003; 134-135).
An Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization o f Indians was passed only seven 
years later in 1857, offering enfranchisement^ to “Indians” for the first time in history. 
Since it was illegal for the “Indians” of Upper Canada to obtain liquor the 
enfranchisement option offered them a legal solution. Finally in 1876 all laws 
concerning “Indians” in Canada were consolidated within the first Indian Act. Under this 
consolidated act it was made a criminal offence to “sell, barter, or give any intoxicant” 
to a “male or female, who is reputed to belong to a particular band, or who follows the 
Indian mode of life, or any child of such person”(s.79). It also for the first time
"Enfranchisement was the voluntary or involuntary loss of Indian status.” Individuals who 
were enfranchised gained “certain benefits, which varied over time according to changes in the Indian Act. 
Early major benefits were full Canadian citizenship and ownership of a parcel of reserve land. A later 
benefit was the one-time payment of the individual's shares of band funds and aimuities.” Resectrching 
Your Aboriginal Ancestry at Library and Archives Canada. Canadian Genealogy Center. 
http://www.collectionscanada.ca/genealogy/022-607.002.01.01.18-e.html
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criminalized possession of alcohol for “Indians.” This specifically removed drinking 
rights fi'om all members of the “Indian” and “Non-Treaty Indian” classifications in 
Canada regardless of their past or present reliance on trade, or their desire to live under 
prohibition for the first time in Canadian history.
To control liquor sales to “Indians” the government relied upon its existing 
liquor licensing legislation framework, a relic of the old British Black List law called 
“Interdiction.”
Interdiction and the “Indian List ”
The term “interdiction” first presented itself in Canadian Law in the Liquor 
Licencing Act of 1883, though its origins can be traced back to the much earlier Black 
List of English common law (Lang and McNeely. 1963:2). The law involved the formal 
legal classification of an individual as having a drinking problem and legally barred 
these individuals from the possession or purchase of liquor. Like “Indians,”
“interdicted” individuals occupied a distinct legal classification under Canadian law with 
reduced rights in relation to alcohol sales, possession and the fi'equenting of licenced 
establishments. Under the Liquor Licencing Act of 1883 an interdicted individual was 
not allowed to consume liquor for a period stipulated by the judge’s order and their 
name and likeness were circulated to local taverns and saloons (45 and 46 Vic. c.30).
After the 1876 change to the “Indian” classification, making it illegal to purchase 
or possess liquor, all “Indians” and all “non-treaty Indians” were considered to be on
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this list and were dealt with accordingly. That is, they were conceptualized by 
lawmakers, enforcers and liquor establishment owners as listed, regardless of whether 
they had been legally found to be abusing liquor. These previously independent 
categories of “Indian” and “Interdicted” now had identical legal classifications with 
regard to liquor, and as a result caused serious repercussions to the perception and 
conceptualization of First Nations and drinking in Canada. Although no “Indians” were 
formally listed on the interdiction list, it was understood that all “Indians” were 
conceptually considered on the list for liquor control purposes.
The first impact of the unification of classification was that the interdiction list 
very quickly became known as the “Indian list” in Ontario popular parlance. But perhaps 
more seriously “Indians” were now socially understood as drunks and thus saw an 
increase in the stereotypical traits attached to them (Heron.2003:135;
Valverde.2003:193-222). Now being an “Indian” meant that you legally had a 
“particular susceptibil[ity] to, and [were] likely injured by, the use of intoxicants” 
among other things, as was established by important court cases in Canadian law (Rex v. 
Martin. 1917; Valverde.2003:195). Here one can see the beginnings of Star’s 
convergence concept.
By 1876 First Nations peoples’ new classification as “Indian”/“Interdicted” 
began to impact their reality as they now faced new social situations in which their 
classification status dictated social action and cultural perceptions. This new legal 
classification came with a significant amount of tightness due to the powers of the 
judicial system; albeit the initial adoption of the “drunken Indian” stereotype was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
gradual (Heron.2003; 135). It wasn’t until the formation of the provincial liquor control 
boards, after the period of prohibition had passed, that the tightness reached levels where 
systemic classification depicted, mirrored and constructed reality.
The LCBO and “Indian ’’/ “Interdiction ’’ Classification Convergence
When prohibition ended in Ontario in 1927 the LCBO was charged with the sale 
and control of liquor in the province. At the time the population held to strongly 
temperate values and so fear of the electorate agitating against the LCBO dictated early 
policy and action, forcing the Board to profess temperate values and strictly control 
access to liquor. The government explained to the people that under its system of stores 
“those who can ‘take liquor’ decently shall have it, and that others shall not have it” 
(Willison. 1924). “Others” specifically included all individuals within the “Indian,” 
“Non-Treaty Indian” and “Interdicted” legal classifications, as was specified in section 
44 of Ontario’s Liquor Control Act of 1927 (7 Geo. V c.70). The Board’s fear of serving 
“Indians ” was twofold. First and foremost the Board feared that any “such cases may be 
featured in the press and be seized as opportunity for criticism of the Liquor Control 
Act, vendors and issuers ”(LCBO Circularl292.1931). Secondly the Board feared 
criminal prosecution under the Indian Act or Ontario’s nevi Liquor Control Act, both of 
which specifically criminalized liquor sale to, and purchase or possession for, “Indians” 
and other interdicted persons in Canada (Indian Act. 1876; Liquor Control Act. 7 Geo.V 
c.70).
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To achieve this selective “kind of prohibition”, a vast legal social sort fell on the 
shoulders of the LCBO, its vendors and to a lesser extent the criminal justice system 
(Willison. 1924). On the ground, LCBO vendors were required to assess and classify 
liquor permit applicants along lines of legal classifications of “Indianness.” Owing to the 
difficulty of the task of classifying First Nations peoples based on their official legal 
status, the Board ultimately relied on “prototypical” and not legal signifiera of race when 
classifying “Indian”/ “Interdicted” people (LCBO Circular 1292.1931). It was through 
this zealous act of classification enforcement that the tightness between the 
“Indian”/”Interdiction” classification and reality was achieved.
Prototype theory explains that classification is accomplished though a process 
whereby one learns a stereotype or “prototype”, and then “extends this picture by 
metaphor and analogy when trying to decide if any given thing” fits within a 
classification; “we call up a best example, and then see if there is a reasonable direct or 
metaphorical thread that takes us from the example to the object under consideration” 
(Bowker and Star. 2000;62; Lakoff. 1987; Taylor. 1995). Since the LCBO could not rely 
on lineage as the determining factor of “Indianness,” due to the lengthy process of 
contacting Indian Affairs to consult official lists, they relied upon the “Indian” or 
“Indian mode of life” prototype as their primary means of classification. The prototype 
was of course also greatly influenced by the conjoining of the “Indian” and 
“Interdiction” classifications by liquor control officials as well as the racist discourses of 
the early 20* century and is a key concept in understanding the tightness that was 
ultimately achieved between classification and reality. Unlike all others on the
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“Indian”/“Interdicted” list. First Nations peoples were not sorted due to negative or 
intemperate activity, but due to possession of the now prototypical characteristics of the 
“Indian race,” that is drunketmess. In a circular on Board policy in regards to “Indians” 
the LCBO explained that;
in view of the technical difficulty of deciding whether an Indian may come 
under the prohibitions of the Indian Act, whether he is a non-treaty Indian, 
or whether he may have become enfranchised and occupying the status of 
a white man, vendors, permit issuers and all others concerned are 
instructed to refuse all applications for permits bv persons of Indian 
Blood” (LCBO Circularl292.1931. emphasis in original).
As a cautionary tale the LCBO noted within their circuWs a court case of 1930 
involving an LCBO vendor who was charged for serving an “Indian” (Ibid). In this case 
the court ruled that the individual served by an LCBO vendor “was obviously an Indian 
by appearance” and that since the vendor had “made no effort to inquire into” what the 
court called “the suspicious circumstances” of the purchaser’s “nationality” the vendor 
was to be charged under the Indicm Act (Rex v. Brown C.C.C.29). In this case the 
vendor was convicted and sentenced even though the guilty verdict required evidence 
showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of “positive knowledge on the part of the 
accused as to the nationality of the purchaser” and no evidence of classification beyond 
the appearance of the alleged “Indian” was presented (Ibid). In its final remarks the court 
did not cite the need of the vendor to consult the Indian Registry or the local Indian 
agent, but found that an individual’s nearness to the “Indian” prototype was “obviously”
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enough for racial classification.
These instructions forced the LCBO Vendors to incorporate classification, not on 
established legal status but, on the stereotyped or prototypical concept of race, relying 
specifically on “the Indian mode of life” element (which now included drunkenness) of 
the “non-treaty Indian” classification to justify the inclusion of racist elements within the 
Board’s liquor permit assessment process (Indian Act. 1876. s; LCBO Circular 
1936.1937). This effectively drew validity away fi'om registration or lineage as a 
depiction of race and emphasised the stereotypes and prejudices that were developed by 
the conjoined “Indian”/”Interdiction” list. LCBO reliance upon prototypical 
classification was its their primary means expediting the convergence of alcoholic 
elements of the “Indian”/”Interdiction” classification, with “Indian” identity and reality.
Since LCBO classification methodology was unbound to the reality of official 
“Indian” legal status, a positive feedback loop of classification and prototype formation 
was created within the Board. Fuelled by a situation where, through official Board 
policy, only those who embody the prototype were classified (since classification 
methods relied on prototypical elements), and the actions of those who were classified 
were interpreted through the classification (reinforcing prototypical elements of the 
category), it allowed convergence to run almost without restriction, ever tightening 
classified people’s actions and the perceptions of those actions within systemically 
defined roles - not simply blurring the hnes between classification and reality but 
destroying them. As an “Indian” of Kenora noted:
I have been placed in jail here in Kenora when I was sober. And I was
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jailed for one week. My charge was being drunk on the streets. I hadn’t 
had a drink. (Kenora. ONT 92-10-28 73:98).
This remark tells us that it is not liquor that makes drunkenness but “Indianness.” In 
another case a judge explained that distinguishing between an “Indian” and a drunk 
required an expert eye (Richards v. Cote. 1962):
as to his manner of walking we have only the last witness for the crown, 
who only knew [the “Indian”] for three months, and I don’t think he is in 
a position to judge. We do know, I think, that Indians - 1 have seen at 
Kamsack very often - are not particularly soldierly in their bearing (Ibid).
Even gait could be attached to the prototype and help smooth the convergence fit 
between category and reality.
The Impact o f Convergence
The concept of convergence due to the conjoining of categories lying at the 
centre of alcohol’s association with the First Nations peoples is also supported by 
research regarding First Nations oral history (Chanteloup.2002). Chanteloup found that 
in First Nations oral history the “drunken Indian” stereotype “is more about the state of 
disharmony created through unequal reciprocity by the unethical person and less about 
(our) understanding of the Aboriginal as alcoholic”(Ibid: 155). The problem is more of 
an issue of colonial classification and identity than of substance addiction. Chanteloup 
also writes how First Nations Alcoholic Anonymous groups differ from traditional
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anglo-Canadian groups in that they employ the concept of redeveloping a First Nations 
identity that predated alcohol so that the individual could be free of alcohol’s link to 
their cultural and personal identity (Ibid: 185). Chanteloup‘s investigation is limited to 
what he considers to be the “myths of the Drunken Indian.” Nonetheless, his research 
provides substantial support for the impact of classification and convergence on First 
Nations peoples.
First hand accounts and First Nations historical texts describe how the “Indian”/ 
“Interdiction” classification was detrimental to First Nations communities across the 
province. As the historian Maracle writes:
the law didn’t stop or prevent Indians from drinking, but it did change the 
way they drank - for the worse. Since Indians were forbidden to buy 
liquor, they frequently resorted to drinking other far more dangerous 
intoxicants. More ominously, Indians also had to guzzle their beer, wine 
or liquor as quickly as possible to keep from being arrested.”
(Maracle. 1993.44-45)
Maracle’s findings could be widely confirmed. In 1953, when the Ontario Legislature 
ordered an investigation into the “liquor problem”, a committee of government 
representatives visited bands across the province and heard much of the negative impact 
that classification had had on the First Nations peoples. Chief Peltier of the Fort William 
First Nations explained First Nations drinking behaviour in this way:
now Indians will drink anything - canned heat, shoe polish, alcohol - or 
whatever they can get their hands on from the bootleggers. The Indian is
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always watching out for the police, so he will down whatever he has as 
quickly as he can (1953:474).
A man from Sioux Lookout explained that the source of “Indian” drinking behaviours 
was the law itself (1953:522). He argued that after First Nations prohibition was put in 
place:
‘Fire water’ has been coming in ever since, and we are not able to stop it.
Would [First Nations people] not feel better if they could go in the front 
door like men rather than creep like thieves to get liquor from 
bootleggers? They go to a bootlegger and pay $5 and $10 for home brew, 
poisonous stuff. A few drinks of it will make you crazy, but you have 
held the Indians down so that they have to do that (Ibid).
Prohibition on the reserves also forced drinking into public spaces thus increasing the 
visibility of First Nations consumption and the cultural association of alcoholic 
behaviour with “Indians.” This was especially visible in regional centres of northern and 
rural areas that experienced an influx of people from smaller, remote communities (see 
Jacobson. 1974).
In 1934 the “Indian”/“Interdiction” list mode of controlling “drunkards” in 
Ontario again became the key technology of controlling liquor consumption. From 1927 
to this point those who had “abused” their permit privilege simply had their liquor 
permits cancelled leaving interdiction for only the most hard core and those so ordered 
by a judge. But since liquor started to be served in standard hotels and licenced 
establishments in 1934, cancellations ceased to be a sufficient means of controlling
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liquor consumption. At this point the LCBO turned to the “Indian”/“Interdiction” list to 
fill the need of restricting alcohol consumption, increasing the number of listed 
individuals from 6 in 1933-1934 to over 1,600 by 1935-1936, moving the list from the 
legal realm into the mainstream of popular culture (Annual Reports of the Liquor 
Control Board of Ontariol933-1936). From this period forward “Indians” saw a 
dramatic increase in their convictions for “drunkenness” both under the Indian Act and 
the Liquor Control Act (see table 5-1 below).












^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^
-Convictions of Drunkeness Under the Indian Act
NB - Convictions for “Drunkenness” in Ontario under the Indian Act and the Liquor Control Act, In 
Popham, Robert E, and Wolfgang Schmidt. 1958. Statistics o f Alcohol Use and Alcoholism in Canada 
1871-1956. University of Toronto Press. Toronto.
In 1951 legislation within the Indian Act changed allowing the provinces to 
determine whether or not to give “Indians” the right to drink. In 1954 Ontario decided to
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do so, though the “Indian’TInterdiction” list remained a powerfiil force as, like 
“drunkards” who had regained their drinking rights, “Indians” would have to “show the 
Federal Government that [they] were capable of taking a few drinks and be law-abiding” 
before they were given fijll drinking privileges and the right “to have beer and liquor on 
the reserves” (Robson quoted in Cole. 1953:560). “Indians” now were legally considered 
to be under a partial Board order, having the right to drink in licenced premises but not 
the right to purchase liquor from LCBO stores.
As First Nations leaders from across the province had predicted, their new rights 
had not solved the problems of differential classification and many of their people 
quickly found themselves formally listed by the LCBO (1953). As Chief Adams of the 
Sarnia Indian Reserve explained:
if we took the privileges that you suggest, I could go to the beverage 
room and have a few drinks. Then if I came home to the reserve drunk, 
the RCMP would throw me in jail. It just looks like a trap to me. If  we 
wanted a glass of beer, and could take it home, that would be better. With 
the present set-up, liquor is an awful detriment to the Indian. It is not a 
fair thing. (1953:543).
First Nations peoples were overrepresented on both the Interdicted List and in 
Interdiction related convictions from 1954 until its demise (Interdiction Records of the 
LLBO RG-36-13; Annual Reports of the Ontario Provincial Police. 1927-1970). Before 
1949 interdiction related convictions were literally 0 in Ontario, but they increased 
substantially to over 800 individuals by the late 1960's and “coincidentally” appeared
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alongside the right to purchase alcohol acquired by First Nations.












^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^ ^  ^  ^ ^  ^ ^ ^ ^
- Interdicted Consumption Supplying Interdicted Person -INegel Consumption
NB: First Nations were granted the legal right to drink in public restaurants and bars under 1951 
legislation, while the right to drink in their private residences came later and required Bands to apply to 
the LCBO for “wet” status. This began in 1954 and by 1957 many had done so. By 1962 most had applied 
(LCBO General Correspondence. 1954-1962).
The conjoining of the “Indian” and “drunkard” prototypes was so strong that 
racial aspects of “Indians” attached themselves to non-“Indian” drunks. The Interdiction 
list was conceptualized culturally as exclusively containing the names of First Nations 
peoples and it soon came to be known as the “Indian List.” Some “white” people 
thought that they couldn’t possibly be put on the drunk list nor even be alcoholics 
simply because they were Caucasian (Interdiction List of the LLBO RG-36-13).
A listed person was also conceptually an “Indian.” Individuals added to the list 
saw the same loss of legal rights as the First Nations. Under the Liquor Control Act their
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homes and private property could be “reservationized” by means of conversion into a 
public place, thus no longer requiring police search warrants nor allowing the possession 
of alcohol within them.
By the 1970's, when formal criteria were applied to the interdiction process, we 
can see that convergence had played out its course.
Conclusion
The main purpose of this chapter was to investigate two separate issues - the first 
being the validity of theories of convergence and classification, and the second to 
understand the social history behind the LCBO and the classification of First Nations 
peoples in Ontario.
Some authors like Westermeyer (1996:112) claim that “any single history or 
description of drinking practices” of the First Nations people is severely limited due to 
the variation in cultures and histories of the First Nations, and thus “cannot apply to 
every group.” The shared “Indian” classification and legal history discussed in this 
chapter, I believe, effectively circumvents Westermeyer’s argument, as classification 
and LCBO interdiction policy were not constructed or co-constructed with the highly 
diverse First Nations cultures of Ontario. Since these laws were imposed, and in the case 
of the LCBO imposed with great care to be consistent, then the shared experience of 
classification, as expressed in First Nation’s oral histories, is generalizable to the First 
Nations of Ontario and arguably to the other areas of Canada where liquor control
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boards with similar mandates and disciplinaiy powers were to be found. My approach is 
to detail the imposition of a constructed identity on First Nations that did not interest 
itself in diversity or difference, but acted before the facts through categorization and 
classification. In effect, the LCBO created the problems it then sought to define and 
discipline.
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Chapter 6
Liquor and the Moral Regulation of Women: The LCBO and the 
Interdiction List from 1927-1975
In chapter 4 1 suggested that being a woman significantly impacted how
individuals were dealt with by the LCBO In order to understand this I turn once
again to the Board’s moral mandate to instil temperance morality across the
province. Popular culture in the early 1900's presented women’s relationships
with alcohol in one of three ways; as either “angelic,” since passive and virtuous
women of temperance never took a drink; as the subjects of poverty and violence
at the hands of alcoholic husbands; or as alcoholics themselves prone to
violence, sexuality and uncontrollable behaviour.
Figure 6-1. Women’s Relationships with Liquor as Presented in Popular 
Culture
Uquor Taxation
OnZSNS AWAKE AND ACTT be w jy it r t p w l m d  ( tn icd
» M'SWRRKSS O f 'rJIBLi'JlJUatC.k
Popular representations of women’s relationships with alcohol show an 
interesting commonality in that all women seem to require a strong authoritarian 
Liquor Control Board to protect them from the dangers of liquor.
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In reality women’s relationships with alcohol were much more complex 
than these simple prototypes suggest, though many of Ontario women were 
either active members or supporters of the temperance political movement if not 
the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) itself. In 1842 one in ten 
citizens were members of a temperance society in Upper Canada and the WCTU 
itself boasted over 10,000 members in the early 1900's (Whisky.2004). As late as 
1919 the WCTU was active in organizing a 15,000 person march of temperance 
supporters, bringing petitions signed by over 825,500 people to Toronto in order 
to pressure the provincial government to adopt the Ontario Temperance Act and 
embrace prohibition (Ibid).
When prohibition ended in Ontario in 1927 the LCBO was well aware of 
these prohibitionist arguments and presented the interdiction list (see chapter 3 
and 4) as the key tool that would protect wives and families from the poverty, 
violence and uncontrollable behaviour associated with alcohol addiction 
(Ferguson. 1926;Willison. 1924 also see chapter 1). The Board informed its 
workers that they were to ensure that if an individual “by excessive drinking of 
liquor, misspends, wastes, or lessens his estate, or injures his health, or interrupts 
the peace and happiness of his family” he would be identified and his 
consumption controlled (Liquor Control Act. S.0.1927 c.70 s.95(l)). Once the 
interdiction list was in place, many women sought to activate the disciplinary 
powers of the board to control drinking as well as other undesirable behaviours. 
This chapter will, through an examination of the LCBO’s interdiction files dating
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
105
from 1946-1976, explain how and why women sought to activate the 
bureaucratic power of the LCBO, how and why women were themselves the 
subjects of LCBO bureaucratic power, and finally the impact on identity that 
being a member of the “drunk list” placed on women in Ontario.
Women Listing Others
Woman applicants accounted for nearly 80% of the letters sent by 
individuals to the LCBO requesting interdiction investigations into particular 
individuals. This was more applications than any other group. Most of these 
letters came from women seeking to have their husbands listed, though letters 
were also sent by women in a variety of different relationships (see figure 6-2 
below).








Women did not play a significant role in the listing of other women. Only 
35% of requests for women to be listed came from other women, while women 
made up over 85% of requests made to have men listed. Although women were 
by far the main source of all individual requests made to the Board, rates of
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success for these requests were, however, another matter entirely. Figure 6-3 
(below) gives, as a percentage, the outcomes of requests made to the LCBO to 
have individuals listed. These results are separated by gender and show which 
gender was ordered to be investigated by whom.





















Predominance % 4.69 % 15.49 % 20.19% 1.87 % 77.94 % 79.80 %
Board Response 
No Action 10% 0 % 5.55 % 0 % 23.68 % 11.84%
Disciplinary Action 90% 100 % 95% 100% 76.32 % 88.16%
Warning Letter 10% 12% 11% 66.67 % 17.76 % 42.22 %
Limited Public 10% 0 % 5 % 0 % 0.66 % 0.33 %
Limited Private 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 1.32 % 0.66 %
Listed 70% 88% 79% 33.33 % 56.58 % 44.49 %
NB: Tabulated from all LCBO records in RG-36-13 at the Archives of Ontario. Requests made in 
accordance with ofiBcial institutions, such as the police, were not included. * Not including “self’ 
applications.
When applications to have an individual listed came from men the 
individual was much more likely to be Usted by the LCBO. While almost 81% of 
individual requests made by men resulted in listing, only 56% of requests made 
by women were successful. Though women were less likely than their male 
counterparts to be listed, they were 25% less likely to be listed if the request had 
come from a woman than from a man. A woman was also 32% less likely to 
have successfully listed a man as opposed to applications made by men. In over 
23% of cases where a woman applied for a person to be listed no action was
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taken by the Board, while this number was much lower - just over 5% for men. 
Another matter of note is that the only case where listing was not the most likely 
outcome was when a woman requested another woman be listed. In these cases 
women were twice as likely to simply receive warning letters from the LCBO.
Reasons Provided By Women
Almost all letters to the board applying for an individual to be 
investigated contained a reason. Surprisingly, the reasons provided were very 
similar and could be easily categorised in virtually all cases. These classifications 
were “overindulgence”, “misspending”, “abuse”, “violence”, “control” or 
“none”(if no reason was provided within the application). An investigation into 
the files in which women were the applicants yielded the following 
predominance of reasons as well as the following outcomes of Board responses. 












No Action 38.7 % 11.1 % 20.0 % 35.7 % 46.2 %
Warning Letter 12.9 % 27.8 % 16.7 % 28.6 % 23.0%
Listed 48.4 % 72.2 % 60.0 % 35.7 % 30.7%
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
108
Overindulgence
Overindulgence was most often cited as the reason why women requested 
to have people listed, making up 25% of all applications. The bulk of these 
requests were made by wives, though mothers were a close second. Of these 
cases 48% resulted in listing while 38% were dismissed by the LCBO. 
Overindulgence was the reason that had the lowest success rate for women and 
their “overly temperate” or “nagging” nature was cited in many of the 
investigations that followed upon these requests.
It can be seen throughout the Interdiction files that in some investigations 
conducted by the police or the LCBO’s own investigators, women’s requests for 
having an individual listed were either not taken seriously or the women’s 
opinions were devalued by investigators. The main explanations given to 
disregard the request were that the woman involved was either emotional or 
presented overly temperate values. One LCBO investigator explained of the 
individual being investigated that “his mother is quite temperamental and it has 
been ascertained that she wrote a letter to the Liquor Control Board of Ontario 
requesting renewal of the Prohibitory Order mentioned above while in a fit of 
temper” and so she needn’t be taken seriously (#352). In another case, an 
investigator cited a husband’s intemperate actions as caused by his wife “putting 
undo stress on him and his business” and having “deprived [him] of sexual 
intercourse” for a period of “six weeks” arguing that the investigation should be 
dropped (#166). In yet another case a woman that applied for her husband to be
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listed because he was physically abusive when he drank, lead the police 
investigator to report that;
as stated in Mrs. _ ’s letter he does get abusive when drinking and 
I have been to the residence on 2 occasions during the past year 
[to investigate abuse cases], but Mrs. _ does not help much as she 
is a teetotaller [a member of the Woman’s Christian Temperance 
Union] and is strictly against drink of any kind” (#271).
In both of theses cases the investigators opted not to recommend listing.
Abuse and Violence
All women who contacted the LCBO to have someone listed specifically 
for “abuse” were wives trying to have their husbands put on the list. Of these,
65% were ultimately successful, while 30% of those under investigation were 
awarded a warning letter or received no disciplinary action at all. To add to this 
7% of all applications made by women cited “violence” as the reason for their 
request. Again wives made the most requests though some mothers also 
attempted to have people listed under this classification. Of the cases brought 
forward by women that cited violence, over 90% were directed towards men. 
Within these files 44% were listed while 55% were the recipients of a warning 
letter or no disciplinary action at all. If one were to combine the abuse and 
violence files they would account for over 21% of all applications by women.
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LCBO policy also indirectly contributed to this violence and abuse by 
strictly adhering to the regulation of informing individuals that they were the 
subject of investigations and exposing the name of their accuser. In all “abuse” 
and almost all “violence” cases this would have been the abusive husbands of the 
wives who had contacted the LCBO. Of all investigations that ended before the 
LCBO could rule on them, 36 % were halted by an applicant who did not want to 
be identified after they discovered that their identity would be revealed to the 
person under investigation. In cases where the applicant wished to remain 
anonymous the LCBO would issue a standard response explaining how anyone 
under investigation had a right to know who had accused them and that “the 
source of the complaint wUl not remain confidential.” * Although it was against 
official Board policy, at times investigators would side with abused women and 
advise LCBO head office not to report the name of the applicant whom had 
requested the investigation. However this was definitely not the norm; neither 
was there any evidence that the Board respected the investigators’ wishes. No 
notation was made in these case files that suggested how the Board had reacted 
to sympathetic investigators or if they had disclosed the personal information of 
the applicant.
These case files also include some of the outcomes following the 
discovery by husbands that it was their wives who had applied for an
‘Investigation Procedures For An Order of Interdiction.” Interdiction
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investigation. In one case an investigator writes that when the husband found out 
“he was very angiy and stated that if he was placed on the prohibited list he 
would make his wife leave home”(#246). Threats of violence and death were not 
uncommon for an investigator to report and it is safe to say that this LCBO 
policy put the women involved at greater risk.
Misspending
Misspending was the third most common reason provided by women 
seeking to have someone listed. It made up 14% of all applications made by 
women and was ultimately one of the most successful reasons a woman could 
use to have an individual listed. These requests were mostly made by wives, 
though mothers were a very close second. Within LCBO documents it is quite 
often emphasized that “liquor must not be sold” to those whose financial 
standing “is such that the sales must be followed by a diminution of the comforts 
of life in the family,” and finances as well as employment were intensely tracked 
through its permit system (LCBO Circular 1766,1936). Female applicants 
requesting interdiction orders for “misspending” often communicated the 
desperateness of their situation to the LCBO and most investigations supported 
their claims. As one investigator reported:
Mrs. also showed the writer some 18 pints and a great number
of empty beer cartons in the cellar, and she asked if it would be
Files o f the LLBO, RG-26-I2 Series. Archives of Ontario: Toronto.
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possible to have this collection returned to the local Brewers 
Retail Store here in [city] and get the money in order to maintain 
the home and keep her three teenage boys, her husband has no 
job, as the last two he led he was discharged for drunkenness 
(#347).
Since these situations specifically depicted an element of the LCBO’s moral 
mandate, it is not surprising that over 88% of individuals reported by women for 
“misspending” were awarded disciplinary action by the Board, and 72% were 
listed.
Control and No Reason
Of the reasons that have been listed under “control” the most common 
were “family problems” and “goes crazy,” though statements depicting a desire 
to control non-drinking behaviours were the defining characteristic of this 
category. The attempt by women to use the disciplinary power of the Board as a 
means to restrict non-drinking related behaviour, as a punishment and even for 
retribution, can be seen predominately in these cases. The most obvious example 
was a case that cited the reason “out of line” for her son to be listed. More 
generally investigators reported relationships like the following.
Mr. was late in arriving at a pre-arranged meeting place, thus
causing [the applicant] to stand for some time on a street comer
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while waiting for him. Finally, when he arrived, it was evident 
that he had been drinking and his mother attributed this fact as the 
cause of his late arrival (#352).
Some cases even provided evidence of women’s past success in using the 
interdiction list to control behaviour. In one extreme example a mother had her 
son put on and taken off the Interdiction list 25 times in a 3 year period, citing 
his compliance when she wanted him removed and his disobedience when she 
wanted him re-listed (#183). After the 25**̂  application the LCBO informed the 
mother that they were not “to be used whimsically” but only to control abuses of 
the permit privilege (ibid). Cases that fell under this “other” category were the 
least successfiil of all reasons supplied by applicants. Over 46% did not result in 
any Board action while 23% received warning letters and just over 30% were 
listed.
In 10% of applications made by women no reason was supplied to the
LCBO at all. They simply wrote things like “please add my [relation]  to the
interdiction list.” These requests ultimately lead to the listing of just over 33% of 
the individuals investigated, making it one of the least successful strategies.
The Moral Regulation o f Women
Far fewer women were listed by the LCBO than men, making up less 
than 15% of the total cases. The reasons given for listing women were 
considerably different than those for men. The files of women listed by the
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LCBO depict how the Board used its regulations as a tool to structure women’s 
relationships and identity in an attempt to construct and maintain the positive 
image of virtuous women of temperance in the province.
The LCBO’s attitude towards female drinkers was the same as the 
temperate public opinion of the time: “good” women were against drink of any 
kind and that “a female in a public drinking establishment was probably a 
prostitute” and definitely of inferior moral character (Heron.2003:289). To 
protect the morality of both men and women, women were only legally allowed 
to drink publicly within designated “ladies and escorts” areas of licenced 
drinking establishments - an area that was legally regulated differently than 
men’s sections and required to be separate as well as having its own separate 
entrances and washrooms (Ibid:294). Women were allowed to drink within these 
specifically defined legal and cultural spaces, but they could only do so under the 
protection of their “escorts.” As Heron writes, “the authorities who regulated 
public drinking did not lose their suspicions about [these woman’s] shady 
morality” either (Ibid:289).
Ensuring that these drinking regulations were being upheld the Board 
required a team of inspectors that roamed the province investigating licenced 
establishments and LCBO stores, scrutinising everything from the size of 
drinking glasses, the adherence to building regulations and of course the content 
and morality of the clientele. Liquor inspectors for the LCBO (and later the 
LLBO) had mandates almost exclusively devoted to morality, most importantly
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controlling the perception of drinking. Women drinking in standard hotels had to 
step lightly around the liquor inspectors and be sure that they did not stray far 
from their escorts, lest they were caught talking to an unmarried man. The 
ultimate faux pas, however, was leaving the “ladies and escorts” room and 
entering the male side of drinking establishments. As one inspector described 
this terrible act. she “neglected her children by staying out all night and spending 
her time in the married men’s room of the [drinking establishment]” (#47). This 
woman was promptly listed by the Board.
Figure 6-4. Temperance Poster Depicting the Neglect of Children
“ P U a if g ttin th u n s ... "
NB: In Heron 2003:289.
Women could also drink within their homes, yet even there drinkers were 
the subject of gossip and held by the LCBO to different standards of proper 
drinking when compared with their male counterparts. The Globe reported on 
women purchasers as if they were spectacles for public consumption. Several 
articles were critical of women who “wheeled baby carriages” when making their 
purchases or asserting their right to drink (The Globe. They Line Up Quickly to
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Get Their Liquor Once Stores Are Open. June 2 ^  1927).
Women’s physical features and the conditions of their homes were also 
commented on in official investigation documents of the LCBO, and statements 
such as “she had not bothered to do the laundry or clean up” or “I was shown the 
refrigerator which had an ample supply of food also the cupboards were well 
stocked, the home was neat and tidy and nicely furnished” were commonplace 
(#164; #178). What was of greater importance, however, were elements of sexual 
deviance in their lives. The presence of men, other than husbands, in the 
women’s lives were of great importance to investigators. In one police report to 
the LCBO an officer felt it pertinent to wonder whether a woman should have the 
light to drink if she was visiting a married man’s hotel room, even though the 
man “seems very friendly with her hu^and” and was reportedly a family friend 
(#64). In other cases sexual promiscuity was shown to be sufficient grounds for 
listing. As one investigator reported; “Mrs. _ is guilty of associating with another 
man and the younger members of the family are aware of their mother’s 
conduct” (#283). The children, the investigator concludes, “ are better off with a 
father who drinks in moderation than a mother whose conduct is questionable” 
(Ibid).
Applications to Have Women Listed
Applications to have women listed came from a wide variety of sources.
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but the bulk had institutional sources.
Figure 6-5. Applicants to Have Women Listed
Applicant Predominance % Applicant Predominance %
Police 34.2 % Father 2.9 %
Judge 16.2 % LCBO,
Investigator
2.9 %
Self 14.7 % Son 1.5 %
LCBO, Board 13.2 % Brother 1.5 %
Husband 8 8 % Mother 1.5 %
Daughter 4.4 % - -
NB- Totals may be above 100% due to multiple applicants within a single application. 
Police
Police conducted most of the liquor investigations for the LCBO in the 
regions of the province that did not have regular Board investigators. This is 
perhaps why police requests to the LCBO in most cases held the key words and 
concepts that were written into the Liquor Control Act concerning who should be 
listed. In 100% of police requests the women involved were the recipients of 
disciplinary action and over 95% were listed. The police were so successfiil in 
listing individuals that the Chief Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police 
thanked the LCBO for its “cooperation” fi’om 1928-1959 (Annual Reports of the 
Ontario Provincial Police. 1928-1959). Most police requests against women were 
due to “violence” (24%), while “neglect of children” and “overindulgence” were 
close behind at just under 20% each.
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Judges
Judges, under the regulations of the Liquor Control Act, could order 
individuals to be listed by the Board as part of their sentences (SO. 1927. c.70 
s. 98(1)). Judges orders were usually “fiill orders”, meaning the listed individual 
would be unable to purchase or consume liquor legally, and were indefinite in 
length. Since judges could order the listing of individuals, these were rarely 
investigated. The LCBO did, however, have within its power the right to 
overturn judges orders but this occurred in only a minute number of cases and no 
LCBO records exist of any judges orders against women being overturned.
Individuals
Individual requests made up approximately 32% of all requests made to 
the board for female additions to the interdiction list. Most individual requests to 
have women listed came fi’om the women themselves, asking for their own 
names to be added to the list. When an applicant requested themselves to be 
added to the list only a minimal investigation was conducted by the LCBO and 
the indi\hdual was often listed without question. While some women did this of 
their own accord most requested to be listed out of fear that they would be forced 
by their listed husbands to illegally obtain liquor for them. This was undoubtedly 
a matter of self-defence. In the remainder of the self-directed requests made by
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women, about 2% appeared typed on official police letterhead and were signed 
as witnessed by police officers.
Institutions were much more successful in listing women than were 
individuals. While the successfiil percentage of individuals listed by other 
individuals was approximately 65%, institutions could boast a near perfect 98% 
(see Figure 6-5 below).
Figure 6-6. Results of Individuals’ and Institutions’ Requests to Have 
Women Listed




Husband Father Daughter Individual
All*
No Action 0% 0% 0% 16.7 % 0% 0% 7%
Disciplinary
Action
100% 100 % 100% 83.3 % 100% 100% 81%
Warning Letter 5% 0% 2% 16.7 % 0% 33% 17%
Limited 0% 0% 0% 16.7 % 0% 0% 2%
Listed 95% 100% 98% 66.7 % 100% 66% 65%
*NB: Modes includes data from all cases, not simply those listed above.
Reasons Provided
Of all reasons provided to have women listed, the most common was 
“overindulgence.” Still, no reason was provided at all in 33% of women’s files. 
Of all the reasons provided, again the issues consistent with temperance morality 
proved the most effective.
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Figure 6-7. Reasons Provided Within Applications to have Women Listed
Reasons Provided
None Overindulgence Hust>and on 
List
Control Neglect of 
Children
Misspending Violence











Disciplinary Action 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 85.7 % 100% 100%
Listing 95.2 % 89% 100 % 80% 85.7 % 100 % 83.5 %
None
Of all requests to have women listed by the LCBO 30.8% were not 
accompanied by a reason. Almost half of these requests were the result of 
judges’ orders. Technically, judges orders did not need a reason to have someone 
listed but since judges required proof in open court of intemperance in order to 
file for an order of interdiction one can extrapolate that these women had been 
charged under the criminal code or under the Liquor Control Act and received 
the order as part of their sentence. The other half of requests that did not cite a 
reason came from internal investigations conducted by the Board itself, initiated 
by local liquor vendors, LCBO investigators or the Permit Department at Head 
office (see chapters 2 and 3). The small remainder of applications made without 
a reason given were submitted by husbands, fathers, the police and the women 
themselves. Of these requests 100% ultimately resulted in disciplinary action of
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some kind, while 95% of women requested without any reason were added to the 
list.
Husband On List
17.7 % of requests for listing women were precipitated by the 
intemperate acts of their husbands. Police explained these listings as a necessary 
precautionary measure because it was understood that husbands would often 
force their wives to illegally obtain liquor for them. As one inspector explained: 
“if he plans to send Mrs. _ out to purchase beer, it won’t work this time because 
Mrs. _  has requested that her name be placed on the order also”(#335). No 
records exist of any man being listed by the Board because he might purchase 
liquor for his wife. Although most women accepted listing willingly others felt 
that it was an unwarranted curtailing of their rights. When women were listed 
because of their husbands there was no notation on the list that indicated that 
they had been listed due to their husbands’ behaviour and they were no different 
legally or conceptually from those listed for convictions under the criminal code 
or Liquor Control Act.
Neglect o f Children
Compared to their male counterparts, women were requested to be listed 
almost 14 times more often for “neglecting their children.” Legally allowed to
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drink or enter the “ladies and escorts” room at standard hotels, women with 
children who drank publicly were still seen as highly suspect since they were 
obviously disregarding their primary role as family caregivers. Even in cases 
where women had arranged for someone to watch their children the Board 
disapproved and had women listed since they were neglecting their duties as 
mothers. One such report stated;
Mr. _ coming home from drinking all afternoon found that his 
wife was out with the children. She returned in a semi drunk 
condition and her husband became angry and assaulted her. It was 
determined that Mrs. _ had...left the children alone while she was 
drinking. [The Police] would kindly ask that a Board Order be 
issued against Mrs._. (#109)
Although this particular case was extreme, the role of women as homemakers 
and caretakers of the family’s children is clear in all of the cases where women 
were listed for “neglecting children” and “misspending” family income. From 
the above example one can see the implied role of women as primary caregivers 
since blame fell on the mother who abandoned her children for drink and not the 
husband, who had been “drinking all afternoon” (Ibid). In the case of women 
“neglecting children,” almost 86% were ultimately listed by the LCBO.
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Control
Just over 8.9% of the cases could be categorised under the central theme 
of “control.” The specific reasons provided in the requests were “not obeying 
orders”, “fighting with [husband]”, “neglecting house chores”, “up to her old 
tricks” and “leaving [her husband]”. Out of these “leaving her husband” was the 
most common, and it was documented by the police or Board investigations that 
many of these cases were the result of women fleeing abusive situations. Of all 
the interdiction files against women those that cited reasons of “control” most 
clearly display the alignment of LCBO powers with other institutions and 
individuals toward the goal of regulating female behaviour. These files were 
initiated mostly due to applications from mothers but husbands were a close 
second. In one case police were investigating a woman for being listed because 
of “leaving her husband” and were completely confused about why she would 
want to leave her home when her husband was intoxicated - even though they 
“had received several phone calls from Mrs._ stating that her husband is out 
getting drunk and will beat her up when he gets home” (#206).
Violence
“Violence” accounted for approximately 10% of all requests to have 
women listed by the LCBO. Requests that cited violence mostly came fî om city
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and provincial police but some were also the result of judges’ orders. Of the 
women investigated due to requests that cited violence all were the recipients of 
some type of LCBO disciplinary action while approximately 83% were officially 
listed.
Overindulgence
Overindulgence was cited approximately 21.6% of the time as the reason 
behind the applications to have women added to the LCBO’s list. During the 
period of study all individual consumption of liquor was tracked by the LCBO 
through passport type documents called liquor permits (see chapter 2). Police had 
the right under the Liquor Control Act to demand to see these permits, without a 
warrant, in order to review purchases for evidence of excessive drinking. The 
bulk of the requests for listing women for overindulgence came from the police. 
All overindulgence cases resulted in disciplinary action from the LCBO and 
almost 89% of these women were listed by the Board.
Misspending
As with their male counterparts women’s misspending of their income 
was considered a very serious allegation by the LCBO. As argued previously, 
controlling misspending was one of the Board’s mandates and in 100% of the
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cases where women were investigated for “misspending” they were ultimately 
listed. This made misspending the reason with the highest success rate for listing 
women.
Impact o f LCBO Listing on Identity
The impact of being listed was globally significant. As Star, Bowker and 
Neumann (1997) have reported, institutional classifications impact both how one 
is perceived and treated by others as well as self-perception. Generally, the 
impact of the interdiction classification on individuals was the same: shifts of 
compliance towards their given classification, ultimately resulting in self- 
identification and self-discipline through the interdiction list. The following 
excerpts are from the interdiction case files of a listed woman who almost 
perfectly personified the social relations that were present within the files of 
interdicted women: she had an abusive husband; she was listed repeatedly on 
moral grounds; but most importantly, there is a clear shift from defiance to 
compliance and then to self-discipline that is consistent to some extent with all 
files of women listed by the LCBO. Let’s look more closely at this example and 
the subsequent shift in her reported behaviour as she comes into contact with the 
LCBO’s Interdiction list.
“SK” was first requested to be listed by her mother at the age of 22. 
Despite the fact that no reason was provided in her mother’s application, the
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LCBO listed her with their most severe disciplinary tool - an indefinite Full 
Board Order. Here we can see both how SK was presented as the dangerous 
“uncontrolled” woman drinker from temperance stereotypes and how the Board 
lent its power to authority figures within families to control unwanted behaviour. 
The Board’s subsequent investigation discovered that SK “certainly abuses her 
privileges and is not in a position to hold a job and must be quite a strain on her 
parents.” Like most individuals facing their first interdiction order, SK responded 
defiantly stating:
On receiving your letter this 29^ day of July [year] stating that I 
am on the black list, I would like to know the reasons given and 
by whom I was put on. If it is some of those supposed to be first 
class proprietors that not only think they own the beverage room 
but the whole town. She had better be checked up on, because the 
laws of the Liquor Control Board do not say a lady can be behind 
the bar of a beverage room and can not wander through the men’s 
beverage room. The only reason I can figure given as to me being 
put on the list is spite and if this is a law then there should be lots 
of new laws passed because it is only ‘pick and choose’ in [City] 
or there should be a lot before me to go on this list. I remain. Mrs.
[SK]
Surprisingly, the Board responded that their “sources are confidential,” since as 
argued previously even in cases of extreme abuse the Board told women that
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their names could not be kept from their abusers. SK had been listed based on the 
findings of a Board investigation and that the matter was considered closed, but 
she responded again:
On receiving your letter of Dec 2"‘* stating that the order made 
against me on July 29*** [year] I would like to thank you for your 
trouble and as I am quite sure who is behind the so called 
inquiries you received, there should be a lot more orders made 
against some of the others that are far worse than me. It is too bad 
there is pick and choose from a person that has no room to talk.
The proprietor of our two hotels uphold women who have their 
children run the streets hungry, at least mine are fed and looked 
after when I go out. Of course those supposed to be high class 
people are liked better than us supposed lower. Seeing the town is 
getting so strict there should be more checkups made. Of course 
spite holds only so long and its plain to see that money talks.
Thinking of you again from your letter, I remain - Mrs. [SK]
To appease her, the Board reduced SK’s full order to that of a partial order, 
limiting her to home consumption only. In this way her case is fairly unique as it 
was quite rare for the Board to change an order once one was made. SK 
contacted the Board again three years later, seeking to have her order removed. 
The resulting investigation reported the following:
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Mrs. [SK] has a considerable amount of liquor shipped in for 
home consumption but has avoided criticism since she has been 
denied beverage room privileges. She neglects her children by 
staying out all night and spending her time in a married man’s 
room in the hotel. This particular married man has a wife and 
three children but he is at present spending much of his time at the 
home of Mrs [SK], although he seems very friendly with the 
woman’s husband. Mrs [hotel owner], who controls the two 
beverage rooms in [city] will not allow Mrs [SK] in the beverage 
room even if she is off the list. Her behaviour was so bad before 
and she neglected her home and child (she now has two children) 
so much that she was a common topic for gossip and criticism. I 
feel that this woman has not changed and to save her children 
from fiirther neglect, I recommend that she still be barred from 
drinking rooms.
At this point SK carried within her file the prototypical element of the 
“dangerous woman drinker,” of being “uncontrollable,” and now other elements 
of the prototype became attached to her. Within this report SK was then found to 
be sexually promiscuous as well as neglecting her children. One might attribute 
the prototype’s influence for the further element of neglecting her children but 
“her behaviour was so had before and she neglected her home and child” 
suggests a reinterpretation of past events through a newly applied label. For
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many women a second investigation presented far more historical cases of child 
abuse, overindulgence or other unacceptable behaviours. In this case SK was 
listed for a period of one year.
Within two years SK was under investigation again. This time her 
investigation came at the request of her husband. Within the application her 
husband explained that she needed to be interdicted again because she was not 
“obeying orders.” Here we can see how Board power lent itself to the 
reinforcement of dominant gender roles, and how SK’s identity as a free woman 
is called into question. SK was listed for a period of one year after an 
investigation based on the testimony of her husband and doctor. To this SK 
responded;
In regards to your registered letter I received dated 1®* of 
September I would like to ask a little information in regards to it. I 
would like to ask who sent the prohibition against me and for 
what reason. I was cut off for 24 hours on June 9* for that 
evening as far as I knew, and now going on four months later I get 
a letter prohibiting me for one year and I haven’t entered the beer 
parlour since and have received a bit by mail before June 9*.
Nothing had been mentioned to me since. Please register my 
return letter as I do not think it was very clear that this is of course 
a small town. Thanking you kindly. Mrs [SK]
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From her response a clear change in behaviour is notable. First she does not deny 
the validity of the Board’s process as she has in previous letters. Secondly she no 
longer denies that she should be listed, but does however argue for a reduced 
amount of time on the list. Finally, though she still wants to confront whomever 
placed her on the list, she asks the Board to reply to her in a more private way 
noting the impact of the negative stigma of the Board’s investigations and 
interdiction orders. As this is her 3̂"* interdiction the number of interviews that 
the Board investigator would have conducted throughout her community 
regarding her drinking and subsequent “neglecting of her children” and “sexual 
deviance” undoubtedly spread these aspects of her classification throughout the 
community, regardless of whether they were true or not. The impact of this 
investigation process seems to have been substantial as it is noted in both SK’s 
request for greater discretion by the Board and in the previous investigator’s 
report of public gossip and criticism.
The Board responded with a short note saying “that the action in question 
was taken because of an official report received” also informing her that “it was 
believed to be in the best interests of your family .” SK responded again;
As I inquired here about myself I was told to write for 
information. This does not seem to be right according to the 
Liquor Control Board Laws. I was cut off on June 14* [year] and 
haven’t entered a beverage room since and now I receive a letter 
stating my year of blacklistment starts on September [year]
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three and a half months after. I cannot see why my year was not 
started from June 14* [year] when I was cut off for a reason I yet 
do not know, and by whom was it sent? I wrote before and 
received no answer after receiving my year’s enlistment. They 
told me to write as they also can not see why my year hadn’t 
started when I was cut off June 14* not 3 Yz months after. Hoping 
this explains me clearly. I remain [SK]
The Board responded that “this action[interdiction] was taken pursuant to 
medical advice received as well as the findings of our own investigation and this 
could not be accomplished earlier to enable us to issue the order before the above 
mentioned date.” Interestingly SK’s points about dates of action and 
investigation are valid but she does not, as she did in previous years, continue to 
fight the Board on this matter. Here one can see that her resistance to the Board’s 
power is beginning to decrease noticeably.
Within a year SK again came to the attention of the LCBO. In a police report 
investigating her husband the police reported:
Investigation revealed that Mr [K] had come home from drinking 
all evening in a local beverage room, and had found his wife had 
also spent the better part of the evening drinking at home and had 
not bothered to do the laundry or clean the house up. He became 
very angry and as a result assaulted her, and chased the children 
out of the house. Dirty laundry was strewn across the floor. Mrs.
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[K] contacted the writer and requested that she be placed on the 
Interdicted List. She advised that she couldn’t control her drinking 
and felt that the only way that she could do so was to be ‘cut off 
but also requested that her husband [Mr. K], as before, not be 
placed on the Interdicted List as the problems they were having at 
home were all her fault as a result of her excessive drinking.
By this point SK has started to internalize elements of prototypical elements of 
the “dangerous female drinker” as well as adopting the Board’s belief in 
relationships of servitude and temperance implied by their disciplinary action.
This pattern of self devaluation and reliance upon institutional and family 
relationships to dictate “proper” behaviours can be found throughout women’s 
interdiction files. From this period forward she ceases to question being listed or 
bargaining with the Board for her own rights. SK self-identifies as an individual 
who should be listed both because of her drinking and her “unacceptable” 
behaviour.
Her husband’s interdiction records offer an interesting supplement to 
SK’s case. He was investigated repeatedly for instances of abuse yet his actions 
were repeatedly explained through her intemperance. As one police report stated: 
[SK]’s face, on the left side was badly bruised, apparently from 
being assaulted by her husband. Complaints [of abuse] from this 
residence are being received at the rate of two calls per week.
This detachment and [the city] detachment have also received
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several phone calls from [SK] stating that her husband is out 
getting drunk and will beat her up when he gets home.
In this case the police initiated an interdiction investigation even though the 
Board received a letter from SK seeking to have her husband removed from the 
list. The conversion of her behaviour is striking. She writes: “I have asked on 
behalf of my husband Mr.[K], that he shouldn’t be on the list owing to my fault. 
Why should one be condemned on account of one who is wrong all the time? 
Please look into this immediately. I remain. Mrs. [SK].” After receiving two 
more similarly written letters the LCBO conducted another investigation into her 
husband’s drinking reporting that:
Mr. [K] was also contacted and feithfuUy promised that he could 
fully control his drinking habits. He also stated that the reason he 
had previously drank so much was due to the fact that his wife 
drank heavily and neglected her family. Due to the fact that his 
wife no longer drinks and is taking a more a more active part 
towards her family he feels that he would like to enjoy an 
occasional drink.
Remarkably the investigator agrees that Mr. K’s drinking and abuse were due to 
SK’s behaviour. It would seem that SK’s classification is so dominant it is 
constitutive of all the problems within the family.
Over some 10 years SK requested listing for herself on four separate 
occasions and was listed by her husband twice on the grounds that she was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
134
uncontrollable when she drank. SK’s final report to the LCBO strongly depicts 
internalized elements of her classification as well as her need for her desire to be 
controlled by an authoritative body. This makes her convergence with the 
“dangerous woman drinker” stereotype complete both within public perception 
and her personal concept of self. She writes:
I am writing to request I be placed on the interdicted list fiill 
order. I am 53 years old and have two boys 12 and 14 still at 
home. I feel that I am drinking to excess and I am endangering my 
marriage and home. If you see fit to grant my request, I feel it 
would be of great benefit to me. Yours truly. [SK]. Witness.
[Police Officer] Detachment Commander, [city] Detachment
Conclusion
Women’s relationships with the interdiction list were quite complex. In 
some cases interdiction was undoubtedly a tool used by women to achieve some 
measure or share of power. The prejudices surrounding women’s allegedly 
temperate nature, the fact that applicants were not to remain anonymous and 
investigator sympathy towards men limited this assumption of power to few 
cases. When the disciplinary powers of the Board were turned towards women 
the results were detrimental, as SK’s case showed, and women suffered fi"om the 
eflfects of convergence with the prevailing “dangerous woman drinker” 
stereotype. Although not all women were affected by the interdiction process in
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the manner of SK, this obvious change in identity and attitude can definitely be 
seen throughout the interdiction files concerning women and can be attributed to 
the interdiction process itself.
The fact that by and large women could not shield themselves from their 
abusers and the Board acted arbitrarily when it came to providing women with 
the names of those who initiated investigation in of them, clearly exposed them 
to real dangers and proved beyond any doubt that the bureaucracy of 
administrative surveillance was steeped in sexism -  a sexism that was integrated 
into the “disciplinary hierarchy” of the Board as to allowable “discretionary 
behaviour” (Dandeker. 1990:196).
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Conclusion
The main conclusion of this thesis points to the relationship between LCBO 
policy (including surveillance, social sorting and mass categorization), identity 
construction and categorical convergence for both individuals and social groups. 
Although these elements did not act independently, and most likely were mutually 
reinforcing, the former points to constraints upon social action through, the performance 
of labeled acts, while the latter expresses the impact of externally enforced categories, 
through classification tightness, on both the members of the targeted groups and society. 
The LCBO's ability to produce such effects can be traced to the extent and scope of its 
social influence as well as the availability of liquor in Canadian society, but as the 
evidence has shown the nature of the actual technologies used directed, to a remarkable 
extent, the very particular manner in which the LCBO impacted society in the province.
As was shown in this thesis the LCBO’s mix of a bureaucratic social structure 
and reliance upon punch card technologies lead to the adoption of very rigid social 
categories -  individuals either fell into one slot or another, either the hole was punched 
or it was not. These bureaucratic social categories, developed and supported by internal 
policy as well as external social forces, were the means by which all social interaction 
with the Board, and ultimately alcohol, were dictated. Though these categories were 
developed by and large by the adoption of the temperance morality and prejudices of 
early 1900’s Ontario, as described in chapters 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6, their rigidity over time 
suggests an independence from pubUc morality after their initial establishment.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
137
Because of this categorical rigidity the First Nations peoples, women, the poor, 
people of the northern region of the province and the working classes were met with a 
massive monolithic response to their drinking by Head OflSce, local vendors, and 
through categorical tightness, the general public, based on the fixed categories to which 
these social groups were restricted. With regard to identity construction and projection, 
this had massive individual and cultural consequences for anyone deviating from the 
Board’s categorical pigeon hole that dictated their “proper” relationship with liquor.
In the later chapters of this thesis it was shown that LCBO categorization had 
serious personal implications for individuals. Most individuals interacting with the 
LCBO met with panoptic surveillance. As the Board stated, it was the best form of 
control, for those capable of self-control. As argued by Foucault (1977) and others, 
panoptic surveillance lends itself to the integration of desired behaviour into the 
subjected individual’s identity through the processes of self-discipline and conformity 
(also see Norris and Armstrong. 1999). What was of interest in this study of the LCBO 
was the complexity of the systems involved as well as the faith invested in them by 
LCBO policy makers, and thus Ontario’s business elite. The belief, in other words, in 
the regulatory powers of this type of surveillance and the impact the Board felt it could 
have on specific drinking populations. Regardless of this, purchasing and carrying a 
liquor permit can be understood as the LCBO’s first steps into directing individual 
activity through technology and policy.
As discussed in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6, the LCBO’s more serious classifications, 
directed at problem or high risk users, increased dramatically limitations on individual 
action and forced certain classified individuals to engage in “alcoholic” labeled acts by 
leaving them no recourse in substance or place. The modification of their legal status
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gave them limited access to critical social spaces often used to secure employment, 
organize union activity, or socialize with colleagues (Heron.2003;232). The LCBO was 
a key actor in the imposition of severe constraints on such persons. In some cases 
classification even meant the conversion of one’s residence fi’om a private to public 
place, thus removing the requirement of warrants or court orders for police to enter and 
search (Liquor Control Act. R.S.O. 1927 17 Geo. V. c.257.s.42.(2)). What these strict 
provisions meant was that classified individuals who wanted to drink illegally were 
forced into dangerous behaviours including drinking as quickly as possible so as to 
avoid detection, drinking in public places such as parks and streets (since they could not 
do so in their homes or in hotels), imbibing alternative substances and obtaining dubious 
liquor illegally from bootleggers - often at exorbitant prices (Maracle. 1993.44-45). But it 
didn't end there. These acts were themselves defined both publicly (stereotypically) and 
categorically as “alcoholic” behaviours and provided means by which individuals and 
groups were continuously (re)categorized as “alcoholic” by the Board and within 
society.
Figure C-1. Classification Positive Feedback Loop
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When making decisions about interdiction cases, past discipHnary action was a risk 
factor weighed heavily by the LCBO. Of those individuals investigated for interdiction, 
61% had previous disciplinary action while 29% had already been formally interdicted 
(Interdiction Records of the LLBO. RG 36-13). Here again we can see how previous 
classification impacted Board perception and thus encouraged the feedback loop of 
classification convergence.
From the material presented in chapters 4 and 5 it is evident that classification 
not only shaped how an individual’s actions were perceived, in almost all cases 
reinforcing statistically generated stereotypical traits of interdicted individuals, thus 
increasing the impact of classification, and so on; but, over time, the tightness of the 
classification increased as surveillance technologies helped to construct, both 
individually through analysis of data, and culturally through the instilling and 
normalizing of its own social categories, the very situations that they were designed to 
control.
As argued in chapter 3, for those other than “Indians” interdiction lasted a period 
of one year. Those who were listed repeatedly, or whose interdiction was automatically 
renewed annually under the guise of “preventative cancellations,” were repeatedly 
subjected to the Board’s labeling process. The labeling process unfolded with a listed 
individual receiving a letter by registered mail outlining the reasons for their 
interdiction, as well as an explanation of their reduced rights. Similar letters were 
distributed to local drinking establishments and the local and provincial police forces. 
Many listed individuals reported that Board letters aroused attention, gossip and 
effectively spread and reinforced how they were labeled within the community. This
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was especially the case in small and rural towns. Generally, the repeated interdiction 
classification of individuals resulted in reluctant shifts of compliance, in terms of self- 
identification and self-discipline, towards their given classification.
As discussed in chapter 5 the LCBO’s “Indian” classification was unique in that 
it was the only category that did not rely on previously observed intemperate acts to 
determine an individual’s fitness to drink. In other words, such a determination was not 
based on facts or acts. “Indian” classification was based solely on an individual’s 
proximity to the prototype of the “Indian” drinker. In this sense, Caucasians could be 
“Indians” but not vice versa (logically, an "Indian" could not be a non-interdicted 
Caucasian). Unlike all others on the “Indian”/“Interdicted” list (or commonly, the 
“drunk list”), fisted persons were not sorted due to negative or intemperate activity, but 
due to possession of the now prototypical characteristics of the “Indian race” and 
drunkenness.
Since LCBO classification methodology was not bound to the reality of official 
“Indian” legal status under Canada’s Indian Act (1876), the positive feedback loop of 
classification not only led to convergence but also promoted prototype formation and 
development. Fueled by a situation where, through official Board policy, only those who 
embodied the prototype were classified (since classification methods relied on 
prototypical elements), and the actions of those who were classified were interpreted 
through the classification (reinforcing prototypical elements of the category), 
convergence ran almost without restriction, ever-tightening classified people’s actions 
and perceptions of those actions within systemically defined roles. The fines between 
classification and reality were in this manner destroyed. Reality was eventually force-fit 
to conceptuality.
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Although this project is historical, and specific to pre-computer Ontario, the 
conclusions presented here should not for this reason be considered limited in their 
application. Conclusions found here present serious concerns around the types of 
surveillance, social sorts and classification technologies that have proliferated in recent 
years. Questions as to the possible impacts of sorting and classification performed 
everyday by credit card companies, the federal government of Canada or the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security need not be answered with mere speculation, as 
historical projects like this one investigate, explicate and document in detail the social 
consequences of categorical constructions of "risk" populations.
From this study we can take away a much better understanding of how 
surveillance, classification and social sorting technologies impact individuals and their 
concepts of identity. While it is accepted that surveillance and social sorting impact life 
chances and opportunities (Gandy. 1993; Los.2004; Lyon. 1994) this thesis sought to 
better understand how and to what extent this occurs. From this research one can 
definitively state that surveillance, classification and social sorting play an active role in 
the formation of individual and group identity through its bureaucratic inscription and 
circulation; that social sorting technologies were significantly advanced in the pre­
computer era to be a formative part of everyday social understanding; that the method of 
classification, in particular prototypical classification, can impact the level and extent of 
convergence for both individuals and social groups; that panoptic surveillance was 
understood as an effective control of behaviour by the Ontario business elite of the late 
1920’s and that legally supported bureaucratic racial/racist policy coupled with 
surveillance, classification and social sorting technologies can greatly impact the 
widespread perception and life chances of large populations.
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